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Teaching with Feminist Judgments:                    
A Global Conversation 
Bridget J. Crawford, Kathryn M. Stanchi, & Linda L. Berger† 
with Gabrielle Appleby, Susan Frelich Appleton, Ross Astoria, 
Sharon Cowan, Rosalind Dixon, J. Troy Lavers, Andrea L. 
McArdle, Elisabeth McDonald, Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, Vanessa 
E. Munro, and Pamela A. Wilkins†† 
Abstract 
This conversational-style essay is an exchange among fourteen 
professors—representing thirteen universities across five 
countries—with experience teaching with feminist judgments. 
 
† Bridget J. Crawford is a Professor of Law at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at
Pace University. Kathryn M. Stanchi is the E.L. Cord Foundation Professor of Law 
at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. Linda L. 
Berger is the Family Foundation Professor of Law at the University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. The three of us are the authors of this essay’s 
Introduction, Conclusion, and the footnotes herein. All other individual participants’ 
contributions are preceded by the name(s) of the participant(s). This essay is 
dedicated to the memories of Jeanette M. Stanchi (1928-2019) and Jeremiah H. 
Crawford (1936-2019), two proud supporters of the feminist judgments projects. 
†† All other contributing authors’ affiliations are as follows: 
*Gabrielle Appleby is a Professor at the Law Faculty of University of New South
Wales (Austl.), and the Associate Dean of International & External Engagement.  
*Susan Frelich Appleton is the Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe Couzins Professor of Law 
at Washington University in St. Louis School of Law (U.S.).  
*Ross Astoria is an Associate Professor in the Departments of Political Science & 
Law at the University of Wisconsin-Parkside (U.S.).  
*Sharon Cowan is a Professor of Feminist and Queer Studies and Deputy Head of 
School at the University of Edinburgh Law School (Scot.).  
*Rosalind Dixon is a Professor of Law at the University of New South Wales, Faculty 
of Law (Austl.).  
*J. Troy Lavers is an Associate Professor at Leicester Law School at the University 
of Leicester (U.K.).  
*Andrea L. McArdle is a Professor of Law at City University of New York School of 
Law (U.S.).  
*Elisabeth McDonald is a Professor of Law at the University of Canterbury School 
of Law (N.Z.).  
*Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb is the Visiting Distinguished Professor of Law at UIC 
John Marshall Law School and Professor of Law at Mercer University School of 
Law (U.S.).  
*Vanessa E. Munro is a Professor at the School of Law at the University of Warwick 
(U.K.).  
*Pamela A. Wilkins is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Detroit 
Mercy School of Law (U.S.). 
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Feminist judgments are ‘shadow’ court decisions rewritten from a 
feminist perspective, using only the precedent in effect and the facts 
known at the time of the original decision. Scholars in Canada, 
England, the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Scotland, Ireland, 
India, and Mexico have published (or are currently producing) 
written collections of feminist judgments that demonstrate how 
feminist perspectives could have changed the legal reasoning or 
outcome (or both) in important legal cases. 
This essay begins to explore the vast pedagogical potential of 
feminist judgments. The contributors to this conversation describe 
how they use feminist judgments in the classroom; how students 
have responded to the judgments; how the professors achieve 
specific learning objectives through teaching with feminist 
judgments; and how working with feminist judgments—whether 
studying them, writing them, or both—can help students excavate 
the multiple social, political, economic, and even personal factors 
that influence the development of legal rules, structures, and 
institutions. The primary takeaway of the essay is that feminist 
judgments are a uniquely enriching pedagogical tool that can 
broaden the learning experience. Feminist judgments invite future 
lawyers, and indeed any reader, to re-imagine what the law is, what 
the law can be, and how to make the law more responsive to the 
needs of all people. 
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(Linda L. Berger, Bridget Crawford, and Kathryn M. Stanchi) 
The very idea of re-imagining and rewriting judicial opinions 
from a feminist perspective arises from the sense that the original 
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judicial opinions did not “do justice” in either process or outcome.1 
Nearly a dozen feminist judgments projects around the world have 
addressed this sense of injustice by demonstrating how a 
judgment’s reasoning or result (or both) would have been different 
if the decision makers had applied feminist perspectives, theories, 
and methods.2 Using the resulting re-imagined feminist judgments 
in the classroom can help students in a myriad of ways, but 
especially in developing their own roles in addressing what they 
perceive to be the gaps between law and justice.3 Reading the 
 
 1. See, e.g., Rosemary Hunter, Feminist Judgments as Teaching Resources, 2 
OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 47, 56 (2012) (providing overview of feminist judgments 
projects’ aims and methods and discussing feminist judgments as pedagogical tools 
for cultivating critical-thinking skills in law students). 
 2. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW 
(Heather Douglas, Francesca Bartlett, Trish Luker, & Rosemary Hunter eds., 2014) 
[hereinafter AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS] (introducing Australian feminist 
judgments); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Rosemary Hunter, 
Clare McGlynn, & Erika Rackley eds., 2010) [hereinafter ENGLISH/WELSH FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS] (introducing English and Welsh feminist judgments); FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Loveday Hodson & Troy Lavers eds., 
forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter FEMINIST JUDGMENTS INTERNATIONAL] (introducing 
international feminist judgments); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS OF AOTEAROA NEW 
ZEALAND: TE RINO; A TWO-STRANDED ROPE (Elisabeth McDonald, Rhonda Powell, 
Māmari Stephens, & Rosemary Hunter., 2017) [hereinafter AOTEAROA NEW 
ZEALAND FEMINIST JUDGMENTS] (introducing Aotearoa New Zealand feminist 
judgments); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger, & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 
2016) [hereinafter U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS] (introducing U.S. feminist 
judgments); NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: JUDGES’ TROUBLES AND THE 
GENDERED POLITICS OF IDENTITY (Máiréad Enright, Julie McCandless and Aoifer 
O’Donoghue eds., 2017) [hereinafter NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS] 
(introducing Northern and Irish feminist judgments); SCOTTISH FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS: (RE)CREATING LAW FROM THE OUTSIDE IN (Sharon Cowan, Chloё 
Kennedy, Vanessa E. Munro eds., forthcoming Dec. 2019) [hereinafter SCOTTISH 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS] (introducing Scottish feminist judgments); Diana Majury, 
Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada, 18 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (2006) 
(introducing Canadian judgments published in 2008, although dated 2006 because 
of a backlog at the journal); see also The African Feminist Judgments Project, 
CARDIFF LAW AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, https://www.lawandglobaljustice.com/the-
african-feminist-judgments-project [https://perma.cc/7P2G-PYJS] (discussing 
feminist judgments projects occurring in Africa); Call for Papers, THE FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS PROJECT: INDIA [hereinafter India Feminist Judgments Project], 
https://fjpindia.wixsite.com/fjpi/call-for-papers  [https://perma.cc/XS4S-3YFU] 
(discussing feminist judgments projects occurring in India); Sentencias con 
Perspectiva de Género México [Sentences with a Gender Perspective Mexico], 
FEMINISMOS GÉNERO Y JUSTICIA (Mar. 15, 2018), https://feminismosgeneroy
justicia.blogspot.com/ [https://perma.cc/HDY4-H2TA] (discussing feminist 
judgments projects occurring in Mexico). 
 3. See, e.g., Nathalie Martin, Poverty, Culture and the Bankruptcy Code: 
Narratives from the Money Law Clinic, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 203, 238 n.127 (2005) 
(conveying students’ frustration at perceived excessive focus on doctrine in the first 
year of U.S. legal education and positing that exposure to clinical legal educators 
“might help bridge the gap between law and justice, and help integrate theory and 
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rewritten feminist judgments introduces students to often-
neglected problems of gender and racial justice, provides templates 
and resources for making social justice arguments, and helps 
students think critically and creatively.4 
As re-imagined and rewritten by the worldwide feminist 
judgments projects, the re-envisioned opinions enrich students’ 
understanding of judicial decision-making. They do so, first, by 
comparison with the original opinions because the rewritten 
opinions demonstrate that judges, like other human beings, draw 
on what has been embedded in their intuitions and reasoning 
processes by culture and history, as well as by their own 
backgrounds, experiences, and education.5 The feminist judgments 
do so, second, by providing the tools for students to understand how 
persuasion and explanation work effectively within the significant 
conventions and constraints of legal practice.6 
The feminist judgments movement has emerged from an 
informal, international collaboration of feminist scholars and 
lawyers who decided to use feminist reasoning and methods to write 
‘shadow,’ or alternate, judicial opinions.7 The purpose of the 
feminist judgments projects has been to rethink and show what a 
difference a feminist perspective can have on legal reasoning and 
analysis.8 Although their historical, cultural, and socio-legal 
settings differ, the projects share similar methods.9 Each requires 
 
practice early on.”); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Step Away from the Case Book: A Call for 
Balance and Integration in Law School Pedagogy, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 611 
(2008) (arguing that law school pedagogy unduly emphasizes doctrine over skills, 
theory, and critical thinking). 
 4. See infra Part III.B (comments of Kathryn Stanchi). 
 5. See, e.g., John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial 
Decision-Making: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (“[I]n 
recent years the subject of implicit bias—unconscious or subconscious influences on 
decision-making—has reemerged in a variety of psychological and social science 
venues and has potentially significant ramifications in judicial decision-making.”). 
 6. See, e.g., infra Part I.A (comments of Teri McMurtry-Chubb) (teaching 
students that narrative and interpretation are used by jurists to frame their 
decisions); infra Part I.A (comments of Vanessa Munro) (demonstrating to students 
how authorities interpret and apply the law, and the limits of judicial competence). 
 7. See Majury, supra note 2, at 1, 5, & 7 (describing origins of the first feminist-
rewriting project conducted by a group of Canadian law professors and practicing 
attorneys). 
 8. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger, & Bridget J. Crawford, 
Introduction to the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, 
supra note 2, at 3, 5 [hereinafter Stanchi, Berger, & Crawford, Introduction] 
(“Through this project, we hope to show that systemic inequalities are not intrinsic 
to law, but rather may be rooted in the subjective (and often unconscious) beliefs and 
assumptions of the decision makers.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Kathryn M. Stanchi, Bridget J. Crawford, & Linda L. Berger, The 
Necessity of Multi-Stranded Feminist Judicial Opinions, 44 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 
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contributors to grapple with the facts and law in existence at the 
time of the original opinion. All projects share a commitment to 
engaging participants who are more diverse and representative of 
the country’s population than real-world judges.10 
Beginning with the Women’s Court of Canada, this first 
organizing group of law professors and activists began their project 
in 2004 and published an initial set of six rewritten decisions based 
on section 15 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 2008.11 
That collection was followed in 2010 by the English/Welsh 
collaboration, which included twenty-three rewritten opinions 
originally issued by the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal, or the 
Privy Council.12 The next published feminist judgments project 
came from Australia, encompassing twenty-four opinions from 
courts ranging from trial courts to the High Court.13 The U.S. 
feminist judgments project, rewriting twenty-five opinions of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, was published in 2016 (with 
the three of us as co-editors).14 The Northern/Irish and Aotearoa 
New Zealand feminist judgments projects followed in 2017.15 
Feminist Judgments in International Law was published in 
September 2019 and the Scottish project will follow soon 
thereafter.16 Projects are under way in India, Africa, and Mexico.17 
For the most part, participants in the various global feminist 
judgment projects have worked independently from the other 
projects, although loosely aware of their global counterparts.18 In 
 
245, 249–53 (2018) (discussing specific historical context of the feminist judgments 
project in New Zealand). 
 10. See, e.g., ENGLISH/WELSH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 7–9 
(describing importance of producing rewritten opinions that would be plausible to 
lawyers and judges and providing an illustration of what difference greater diversity 
in the judiciary might make). 
 11. See Majury, supra note 2 (introducing the purpose, methods, and work-
product of the Women’s Court of Canada). 
 12. See ENGLISH/WELSH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 9–13 (describing 
scope of cases and range of courts covered in book). 
 13. See AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 1, 14–15 (describing 
scope of cases and range of courts covered in book). 
 14. See Stanchi, Berger, & Crawford, Introduction, supra note 8, at 8 (explaining 
process for selection of twenty-five cases). 
 15. See AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2; 
NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2. 
 16. See FEMINIST JUDGMENTS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2; SCOTTISH FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 2. 
 17. See The African Feminist Judgments Project, supra note 2; India Feminist 
Judgments Project, supra note 2; Sentencias con Perspectiva de Género México 
[Sentences with a Gender Perspective Mexico], supra note 2. 
 18. The exception is Rosemary Hunter; she served as a co-convener of two 
projects. See AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2; ENGLISH/WELSH 
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May 2017, a group of representatives of several feminist judgments 
projects met in person for the first time for a two-day workshop at 
the International Institute for Sociology of Law in Oñati, Spain, 
convened by the three of us.19 In addition to the ideas generated by 
the workshop itself, that meeting in Oñati laid the foundation for 
increased communication among scholars worldwide who are 
working on feminist judgments.20 
As the feminist judgments projects have grown and 
developed,21 a small group of faculty members are using feminist 
judgments as teaching tools at the undergraduate and graduate 
levels.22 We have spoken informally with many people in the United 
 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2. 
 19. See Feminist Judgments: Comparative Socio-Legal Perspectives on Judicial 
Decision Making and Gender Justice, Oñati International Institute for the Sociology 
of Law Workshop (May 11–12, 2017), https://onati.wildapricot.org/event-2458799 
[https://perma.cc/Z4KS-Y7HX]. Out of that workshop came an issue of the Oñati 
Socio-Legal Series of the same name. See also Feminist Judgments: Comparative 
Socio-Legal Perspectives on Judicial Decision Making and Gender Justice, 8 OÑATI 
SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 1215 (2018) (including an introduction and nine essays from 
workshop participants on the methods, impact, and reach of various feminist 
judgments projects). 
 20. See, e.g., @WorldFJScholars, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/WorldFJScho
lars/media [https://perma.cc/MX43-GLM8] (“A group Twitter account for anyone 
involved as an author or editor in Feminist Judgments projects worldwide.”). 
 21. For example, Cambridge University Press is publishing a U.S. Feminist 
Judgments Series, with individual volumes focused on particular subject matters. 
See, e.g., FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS (Bridget J. Crawford & 
Anthony C. Infanti eds., 2017) (existing as the first subject matter-specific book in 
the series). Volumes are forthcoming in the areas of Reproductive Justice, Family 
Law, Employment Discrimination Law, Tort Law, Trusts and Estates Law, and 
Property Law. See also Series Projects, U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT, 
https://law.unlv.edu/us-feminist-judgments/series-projects [https://perma.cc/3D8Z-
RMFH]. Other subject matter volumes may follow. 
 22. See infra Parts I–IV; see also Hunter, supra note 1 (reflecting on classroom 
use of feminist judgments); Jennifer Koshan, Diana Majury, Carissima Mathen, 
Megan Evans Maxwell, & Denise Réaume, Rewriting Equality: The Pedagogical Use 
of Women’s Court of Canada Judgments, 4 CAN. LEGAL EDUC. ANN. REV. 121 (2010) 
(describing experiences teaching with feminist judgments). In 2012, The Law 
Teacher, the U.K.-based journal of the Association of Law Teachers, published a 
“Special Issue on the Feminist Judgments Project” including four articles on the use 
of feminist judgments in law teaching. See Rosemary Auchmuty, Using Feminist 
Judgments in the Property Law Classroom, 46 LAW TCHR. 227 (2012) (describing use 
of feminist judgment writing as teaching about the law of co-ownership); Helen Carr 
& Nick Dearden, Research-Led Teaching, Vehicular Ideas and the Feminist 
Judgments Project, 46 LAW TCHR. 268 (2012) (reporting results of survey of law 
teachers about the concept of “research-led” instruction, such as teaching with 
feminist judgments, and the need to develop students’ critical thinking skills in 
connection with research-led teaching); Anna Grear, Learning Legal Reasoning 
While Rejecting the Oxymoronic Status of Feminist Judicial Rationalities: A View 
from the Law Classroom, 46 LAW TCHR. 239 (2012) (exploring deployment of feminist 
judgments in undergraduate courses devoted to critical reasoning and legal 
reasoning); Caroline Hunter & Ben Fitzpatrick, Feminist Judging and Legal Theory, 
2020] Teaching with Feminist Judgments 7 
States and beyond about using feminist judgments in law school (or 
other) classrooms. This essay extends those dialogues in a written 
‘conversation’ format that includes multiple colleagues from the 
United States, New Zealand, Australia, Scotland, and England. The 
purpose of this written conversation is to continue to share 
knowledge with each other and future instructors who may want to 
teach with feminist judgments. We developed a set of questions 
broadly applicable to those who teach with feminist judgments and 
asked each conversation participant to choose a small number to 
answer. 
In Part I, the contributors describe their own experiences 
teaching with feminist judgments. In Part II, the participants detail 
students’ reactions to working with the feminist judgments. In Part 
III, the contributors articulate their pedagogical goals in using 
feminist judgments and the intended learning outcomes, in terms 
of developing students’ ability to think critically and hone their 
advocacy skills. Part IV invites law faculty (and students) to 
consider how teaching with feminist judgments could be expanded 
or broadened in the future, including the possibility of cross-border 
collaborations with students simultaneously undertaking parallel 
studies in multiple jurisdictions. Part V discusses feminist 
judgments as a blend of activism, pedagogy, and scholarship. 
Finally, the conversation concludes by suggesting that more 
instructors consider teaching with feminist judgments because of 
their positive impact on students’ learning and professional 
development. 
I. Using Feminist Judgments in the Classroom 
A. How have you used one or more of the feminist judgments 




As a New Zealand-based criminal law professor, I have 
primarily used one of the rewritten judgments, R v. Wang, and 
accompanying commentary from Aotearoa New Zealand Feminist 
Judgments.23 This decision and the discussion it inspires are 
 
46 LAW TCHR. 255 (2012) (detailing use of feminist judgments in teaching a legal 
philosophy course); Rosemary Hunter, Introduction: Feminist Judgments as 
Teaching Resources, 46 LAW TCHR. 214 (2012) (introducing methodological 
parameters of feminist judgments projects). 
 23. See Lexie Kirkconnell-Kawana & Alarna Sharratt, Commentary on R v. 
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powerful for use in the criminal law course that all New Zealand 
law students are required to take. In that course, I teach the case 
law, including Wang, and statutory provisions relating to a range of 
defenses. I have always taught these defenses by critiquing their 
application with reference to the victims and/or survivors of family 
violence. The feminist judgment draws on facts from the original 
case file that the actual Court of Appeal decision omitted, and those 
details really engage the students. The reason for the engagement 
is the richness of the facts of the feminist judgment, which provide 
extensive background and context for the abuse suffered by Mrs. 
Wang.24 These were not present in the appeal decision.25 The 
feminist judgment highlights how the common law can develop in a 
way that overlooks, does not recognize, or fails to acknowledge the 
experiences of those from different communities and life 
experiences. It opens the students up to the notion that judgments 
can be criticized and that judges do not necessarily always reach 
the most just decision.26 
 
Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon 
 
We have been teaching from our edited collection, The Critical 
Judgments Project: Re-reading Monis v. The Queen,27 for three 
years now in Federal Constitutional Law, a compulsory LLB and 
JD course at the University of New South Wales in Australia. Ours 
is not formally a ‘feminist judgments’ project, but it has related 
methodologies and commitments. 
In contrast to the plurality of objectives that underpin the 
feminist judgments projects, The Critical Judgments Project was 
written specifically as a teaching tool.28 The book contains 
 
Wang: Finding a Plausible and Credible Narrative of Self-Defence, in AOTEAROA NEW 
ZEALAND FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 497, 497–509. Compare R v. Wang 
[1990] 2 NZLR 529 (N.Z.) (affirming criminal manslaughter conviction of victim of 
domestic violence who killed her sleeping husband), with Brenda Midson, R v. 
Wang—Judgment, in AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, 
at 504 (finding that the jury should have evaluated defendant’s state of mind for 
purposes of determining whether self-defense should be considered in manslaughter 
case). 
 24. See Midson, supra note 23. 
 25. See R v. Wang [1990] 2 NZLR 529 (CA). 
 26. See Elisabeth McDonald & Paulette Benton-Greig, Accessing Court Files as 
a Feminist Endeavor: Reflections on ‘Feminist Judgments of Aotearoa: Te Rino: A 
Two-Stranded Rope’, 8 OÑATI LEGAL SERIES 1241 (2018). 
 27. See THE CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT: RE-READING MONIS V. THE QUEEN 
(Gabrielle Appleby & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2016) [hereinafter CRITICAL JUDGMENTS 
PROJECT]. 
 28. See id. at v (introducing law students to various perspectives on a leading 
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reimagined critical judgments of a single case, an important one 
concerning freedom of political communication decided by the High 
Court of Australia: Monis v. The Queen.29 The critical perspectives 
covered in the book include a number of feminist critiques, but also 
extend the critical project, including perspectives such as a law and 
literature, critical race theory, capabilities, political liberalism, 
restorative justice, preventative justice, deliberative democratic 
theory, and law and economics approach.30 Each theory is 
introduced in the book with canonical readings, supplemented, if 
necessary, by a short commentary explaining the approach, for 
students to first understand the key tenets.31 The book’s focus on a 
single case was also part of its design as a teaching tool. With only 
one set of factual circumstances and legal principles to grasp, the 
commentaries encourage students to engage more directly and 
immediately with the theory presented. Applying different theories 
to the same case allows students to more easily identify those 
aspects of commonality and difference across the perspectives. 
The case of Monis is an ideal vehicle for the book’s teaching 
objective. It engages a foundational constitutional law principle 
(which Australian students must study in Federal Constitutional 
Law) that raises, in tension, multiple values of free speech, freedom 
of religion and the desirability of civility in political discourse.32 
Further, it is the first case that split the Australia High Court along 
gender lines, bringing to the fore the possible saliency of the identity 
of the judges.33 
 
case). 
 29. See Monis v. The Queen [2013] 249 CLR 92 (Austl.) (‘Monis’). 
 30. See CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27 (containing an 
introductory chapter and fourteen additional chapters, with each additional chapter 
presenting a critical perspective that differs in some way from the others in the book). 
 31. See, e.g., Megan Davis, Intersectional Theory: Where Gender Meets Race, 
Ethnicity and Violence, in CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27, at 103–05 
(excerpting Kimberlé Crenshaw’s canonical work on intersectionality). See Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989) (“Because the intersectional experience is 
greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take 
intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in 
which Black women are subordinated.”); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 1241, 1252 (1991) (“Because women of color experience racism in ways not 
always the same as those experienced by men of color and sexism in ways not always 
parallel to experiences of [W]hite women, antiracism and feminism are limited, even 
on their own terms.”). 
 32. See Monis [2013] 249 CLR 92. 
 33. See id. (3-3 split decision in which the three male justices found that freedom 
of political communication made unconstitutional a criminal prohibition against 
10 Law & Inequality [Vol. 38:1 
We have adapted The Critical Judgments Project for one class 
in a twelve- or ten-week teaching term, with an optional assessment 
for students in the final exam. Midway through the course, after 
studying the ‘races power’ in the Australian Constitution,34 
students are asked to read Chapter 1 of the book35 and select a 
critical perspective through which they would like to rewrite a 
judgment in the races power case of Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth.36 
Kartinyeri raises highly contested questions around the role of the 
government in protecting culturally important indigenous sites and 
the supervisory role of the court in relation to parliamentary choice 
under the races power.37 
Having chosen a critical perspective from the introduction, 
students must then read the chapter in The Critical Judgments 
Project on that perspective, and attempt to rewrite the opening 
paragraph of one judgment in Kartinyeri.38 Students are then asked 
to reflect on a number of questions (which are drawn from the 
book).39 Students prepare to discuss these in the upcoming class. 
These questions relate to differences in the style, narrative, and 
voice of their rewritten judgment, the substantial reasoning and 
result of their rewritten judgment, as well as reflecting on the value 
of the rewriting exercise.40 
As teachers, we prepare for the class by collating the rewritten 
opening paragraphs received from students and selecting a number 
 
sending offensive material via the postal service and the female justices found no 
constitutional violation). 
 34. Australian Constitution s 51 (xxvi) (delineating the ‘races power’ provision 
allowing the Parliament to make “special laws” for the people of “any race”). See also 
Rosalind Dixon & George Williams, Drafting a Replacement for the Races Power in 
the Australian Constitution, 25 PUB. L. REV. 83 (2014) (explaining extant 
constitutional races power and possible alternatives to it). 
 35. See Gabrielle Appleby & Rosalind Dixon, Critical Thinking in Constitutional 
Law and Monis v. The Queen, in CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27, at 1, 
(providing background to the case, the legal issues the case raises, the book’s 
inspiration and organization, and suggestions for how to evaluate each theoretical 
perspective presented in the different chapters). 
 36. See Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth [1998] 195 CLR 337 (Austl.) (‘Hindmarsh 
Bridge Case’) (detailing the issue in this case, also called the ‘Hindmarsh Bridge 
Case,’ of whether section 51(xxvi), the races power, allowed the Parliament to enact 
laws that covered aboriginal peoples). 
 37. See, e.g., Michael Blakeney, Protecting the Spiritual Beliefs of Indigenous 
Peoples—Australian Case Studies, 22 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 391 (2013) (evaluating 
protection for spiritual practices of indigenous people under Australian law). 
 38. See Hindmarsh Bridge Case, 195 CLR at 337; CRITICAL JUDGMENTS 
PROJECT, supra note 27. 
 39. Appleby & Dixon, supra note 35, at 15 (including such questions as, “Do you 
think the [rewritten] judgment results in a more ‘just’ decision than those reached 
by the High Court judges in Monis, either in terms of its reasoning or outcome?”). 
 40. Appleby & Dixon, supra note 35. 
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of exemplars to start the in-class discussion. We then guide the 
students through each of the exemplars, asking them to reflect on 
the tenets of the theoretical approach, and the differences these lead 
to in style, reasoning, and results. We also try to generate a 
conversation about whether some or all chosen perspectives are in 
tension with established legal norms in Australia. We discuss with 
students the degree to which some modes of reasoning might 
increase support for the court and its jurisprudence from some 
sections of the community, while reducing it among others. We also 
discuss the relative importance of support for the court from 
political and legal elites versus ordinary citizens or disadvantaged 
members of the community. Finally, a key part of the exercise is to 
get students to reflect on the value of exploring different 
perspectives, from the perspective of understanding the 
contingency to legal decision-making and judicial choice. 
 
Andrea McArdle  
 
I have used U.S. Feminist Judgments in an advanced four-
credit lawyering seminar called Writing from a Judicial 
Perspective, which immerses students in a pending U.S. Supreme 
Court case on an issue of public law and ultimately asks them to 
produce an opinion deciding it.41 My course description begins by 
asking what we would lose if we no longer had the benefit of a 
court’s written analysis of its reasoning. How would litigants and 
their advocates gain access to the basis for judicial decision-
making? What would be the effects on the development of legal 
doctrine? Beyond these practical, process-based questions, the 
description also asks students how the ‘practice’ of judicial writing 
can foreground social-justice perspectives. 
After years of teaching the seminar without the benefit of the 
feminist judgments projects, I now offer the rewritten opinion model 
to encourage reflection specifically on what makes an opinion 
justice-serving. This is another way of asking, ‘What makes an 
opinion feminist?’42 In framing, scope, and methodology, an opinion 
 
 41. See U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2. 
 42. The editors of the U.S. Feminist Judgments project specifically took no 
position on what constitutes a ‘feminist’ opinion, although they acknowledge their 
own views and identify common themes and methods in the feminist judgments. See 
Stanchi, Berger, & Crawford, Introduction, supra note 8, at 3 (“[W]e provided no 
guidance to our contributors on what we meant by ‘feminism’ . . . Yet it would be 
disingenuous to suggest that we ourselves do not have a particular perspective on 
what ‘feminism,’ ‘feminist reasoning,’ or ‘feminist methods’ are. Indeed, without such 
a perspective, we would not have undertaken the project.”). 
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rewritten through a feminist lens can offer a broad canvas for 
exploring questions of substantive and procedural justice. It can 
unlock legal and factual narratives that often remain buried within 
the opinions that casebooks and commentary enshrine as 
‘canonical.’ The feminist judgments I have assigned—to date, five 
or six U.S. Feminist Judgments opinions in a semester—are linked 
doctrinally or thematically to the U.S. Supreme Court case the class 
is excavating. Students thus see multiple exemplars of what an 
intentional re-visioning of a judicial opinion might entail. Because 
there is no formula, the sheer range of feminist approaches 
encourages students to understand the work of opinion writing not 




I have used feminist judgments from the Scottish Feminist 
Judgments Project in my teaching of an undergraduate law course 
at the University of Edinburgh called Criminal Law: Harm, Offence 
and Criminalization.43 The enrollment is around twenty-five 
students. The stand-alone session on feminist judging comes right 
at the end of the two-semester course. The timing is not ideal 
because students suffer from semester fatigue and pre-exam jitters. 
In the future, I aim to integrate feminist judging more fully into 
individual sessions as the course progresses. The benefit of doing it 
at the end of the course, though, is that the students have already 
studied a wide range of topics. I can then offer in one session several 
feminist judgments from across those topics. By showing more than 
one feminist judgment at a time, it is possible to give more of a sense 
of the weight of the whole body of feminist judgments and their 
legacy, so it is still an interesting and worthwhile exercise. 
 
Ross Astoria  
 
U.S. Feminist Judgments is one of the texts in my 
undergraduate course on Law, Politics, and Society at the 
University of Wisconsin-Parkside.44 This course is a sustained 
exercise in normative jurisprudence for which feminism provides 
the particular normative perspectives. We also use Feminist Legal 
 
 43. See SCOTTISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2. 
 44. See U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2. 
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Theory: A Primer45 and Invitation to Law & Society.46 Further, this 
course introduces students to the canon of legal sociology, such as 
Henry Maine’s Ancient Law,47 Émile Durkheim’s The Division of 
Labor in Society,48 and works by Karl Marx49 and Max Weber.50 
Each of these social theories posit a different role for law in 
constituting a particular social form, and we use the feminist 
judgments as ‘data points’ to illustrate and critique these 
theoretical perspectives. The feminist rewrites are hence a central 
aspect of the course. 
When reading a feminist judgment in this course, I prompt 
students with a suite of questions. The questions vary depending 
upon the material, but the first set revolves around the case’s 
internal legal and moral reasoning, contrasted with the original: 
What is the doctrinal foundation of the judgment? What is the moral 
reasoning of the judgment? How do these differ from the original 
decision? Does the holding expand liberty and equality for women 
(and others)? Which opinion would you sign on to and why? With 
the second grouping of questions, we then use the feminist 
judgment to test one or more of the sociological perspectives. 
Students deliberate on these questions in small groups and then 
report back to the whole class. The questions and conversations 
allow students to identify and evaluate how different legal holdings 
impact and reflect the organization of society. 
For instance, Maine’s theory is that the social form has 
“progressed” (his term) from one based upon status to one based 
upon contract.51 One of his central examples of this progression is 
marriage.52 The class reads the feminist rewrites of Stanley,53 
 
 45. See NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A 
PRIMER (2d ed. 2016). 
 46. See KITTY CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW & SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE STUDY OF REAL LAW (2d ed. 2016). 
 47. See HENRY JAMES SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION TO THE 
HISTORY OF EARLY SOCIETY (Pinnacle Press 2017) (1917). 
 48. See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson 
trans., Digireads 2013) (1893). 
 49. E.g., KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY, reprinted in 
CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 142 (Craig Calhoun et al. eds., Wiley-Blackwell 
3d ed. 2012) (1845). 
 50. E.g., Max Weber, The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism, reprinted 
in ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 168 (Richard Swedberg ed. 1999) (1905). 
 51. See, e.g., MAINE, supra note 47, at 101 (“[T]he movement of the progressive 
societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”) (emphasis in the 
original). 
 52. Id. at 146–90. 
 53. Compare Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a 
state statute that treated an unmarried mother, but not an unmarried father, as a 
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Frontiero,54 and Loving.55 After comparing their doctrinal 
foundations and moral reasoning to the originals, we ask whether 
these cases confirm or conflict with Maine’s theory. Students 
identify Loving56 as an instance of society’s moving from statuses 
assigned by White patriarchy to ones configured around contracts 
(reciprocal agreements). 
The feminist judgments also play a central role in the final 
project. Students either compare and contrast a feminist rewrite 
with the original or use the cases (both rewrites and originals) as 
examples in support of either a social or philosophical theory. With 
respect to the compare and contrast assignment, almost all students 
in the course I taught during the last academic year found the 
feminist rewrites to be superior. Students disagreed somewhat 
more, however, as to whether this was because they were feminist 
per se, because the authors were better writers, or because the 
authors were released somewhat from various institutional 
constraints, such as the compromises sometimes required to form a 
majority. Many students, for instance, preferred the moral clarity 
of the rewrite of Griswold (no “penumbras”) but thought its 
explicitness would disqualify it from securing a majority.57 
 
 
“parent,” and so the state must afford both an unmarried woman and an unmarried 
man a hearing on parental fitness before taking custody of either’s children), with 
Karen Syma Czpanskiy, Rewritten Opinion in Stanley v. Illinois, in U.S. FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 142–45 (reaching same result in a concurring opinion, 
but reasoning that only parents who can show that they have willingly assumed 
certain parental responsibilities are entitled to a hearing on parental fitness before 
the state can take custody of their child). 
 54. Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding 
unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis a military benefit program that 
automatically extended spousal benefits to certain married male military personnel, 
but not to married female personnel, absent a showing that the husband was 
financially dependent on the military spouse), with Dara Purvis, Rewritten Opinion 
in Frontiero v. Richardson, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 173, 175 
(reaching same conclusion but “holding that classifications based on sex must be 
assessed under strictest judicial scrutiny”). 
 55. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional a 
state-law prohibition on interracial marriage), with Teri McMurtry-Chubb, 
Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 
2, at 119–36 (reaching same result but using different reasoning that emphasizes 
the historical role of White supremacy and patriarchy in shaping marriage laws). 
 56. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 57. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 81 U.S. 479 (1965) (declaring 
unconstitutional a state-law prohibition on contraception by married couples on the 
grounds that a right to privacy could be found within the “penumbra” of the various 
provisions of the Bill of Rights), with Laura Rosenbury, Rewritten Opinion in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 103–13 
(reaching same result but using different reasoning that emphasizes sexual liberty 
and equality). 
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Kathryn Stanchi 
 
I have used U.S. Feminist Judgments58 in a stand-alone 
seminar on judicial opinion writing for social justice at Temple 
University Beasley School of Law. I have also used some of the 
feminist judgments in independent study and guided research 
situations to help students who were writing on issues of social 
justice. For example, I assigned Leslie Griffin’s feminist rewrite of 
Harris v. McRae59 to a student who was writing a law review note 




I have used the U.S. Feminist Judgments61 in my Social 
Justice Lawyering course at Mercer University School of Law. 
Throughout the course, students consider how lawyers and jurists 
use judicial narrative and interpretation as tools to support or 
oppose existing power structures. Key components of their study are 
motion briefs and appellate briefs drafted in foundational social 
justice litigation. We dissect each brief through genre analysis, 
which serves as our theoretical framework.62 Genre analysis, the 
 
 58. U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2. 
 59. Compare Harris v. MacRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding a ban on the use 
of federal funding to provide abortions to Medicaid recipients), with Leslie C. Griffin, 
Rewritten Opinion in Harris v. MacRae, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, 
at 247–56 (striking down a ban on the use of federal funding to provide abortions to 
Medicaid recipients as violative of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause as well as the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause). 
 60. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, Texas Fetal Burial Law Struck Down in Another 
Blow to Abortion Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2NfLIft  
[https://perma.cc/D99W-Z766] (reporting on Texas federal court’s holding 
unconstitutional a law requiring abortion providers and health care facility to 
provide burial or cremation of fetal tissue). 
 61. U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2. 
 62. See, e.g., Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb 
and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text, and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 156, 167 n.81 
(1999) (arguing that instruction in conventions of legal writing is not the only domain 
of legal writing and rhetoric teachers). On the function of genres, see Bret Rappaport, 
A Lawyer’s Hidden Persuader: Genre Bias and How it Shapes Legal Texts by 
Constraining Writers’ Choices and Influencing Readers’ Perceptions, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 
197, 198 (explaining that genres are “a cognitive process of classification that 
channel thinking and thereby influence individuals’ communicative actions. Genres 
are also central to human communication, understanding, and persuasion.”); see also 
Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 411, 412 (recognizing importance of understanding cognitive function, 
including propensity to categorize items by genre, because “[t]he art of persuasion 
requires empathy as well as a deep understanding of human psychology and the 
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analysis of a particular type of writing in a discipline, provides us 
entrée into how each part of the brief functions to advance each 
party’s theory of the case, and into how the U.S. Supreme Court 
adopts or rejects a party’s framing and reasoning. Additionally, we 
contextualize each social justice case culturally and theoretically. 
One of the cases we study is Loving v. Virginia.63 Prior to our 
discussion of Loving, I ask the students to read each party’s brief, 
the original U.S. Supreme Court opinion, and the rewritten 
opinion.64 To open the class discussion about Loving, I provide 
students with archival documents contemporaneous to the case to 
further immerse them in the world as it was when the case was 
litigated. We then turn to a discussion of how each of the litigators 
chose to frame the arguments in their briefs, the authorities they 
chose to use in crafting the analytical frameworks in their briefs, 
possible reasons for their choices, and the scope of materials they 
incorporated. Our next endeavor is to evaluate the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision along the same axes: how the majority chose to frame 
the issues presented by the parties, the authority it chose in crafting 
the majority opinion, possible reasons for its choices, and the scope 
of materials it incorporated. The feminist judgment for Loving 
serves as a point to problematize student thinking about the realm 




I have used U.S. Feminist Judgments66 in a seminar that I 
called Feminist Theories, Feminist Judgments. At my home 
institution, Washington University School of Law, every upper-
level student must take at least one seminar. Seminars require 
substantial student writing with feedback from the instructor, and 
class meetings typically run for two hours per week, although 
students earn three credits, with the extra credit merited because 
of time and effort devoted to writing. This particular seminar has 
multiple purposes: to acquaint students with feminist legal theory, 
 
complex emotional and intellectual processes that result in perception and attitude 
change”); see also Karen J. Sneddon, In the Name of God, Amen: Language and Last 
Wills and Testaments, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 665, 674 (2011) (asserting that genre 
analysis “is applicable to legal documents” and applying that methodology to last 
wills and testaments). 
 63. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 64. McMurtry-Chubb, Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia, supra note 55, 
119–36. 
 65. See id. 
 66. U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2. 
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to illuminate how to discover and apply such theory in rewritten 
opinions, and to emphasize students’ own writing experiences in 
drafting opinions and commentary—following the pattern used in 
the book. Weekly readings for the seminar come principally from 
two sources: Martha Chamallas’s treatise, Introduction to Feminist 
Legal Theory,67 and U.S. Feminist Judgments.68 
Key elements of the seminar include the following: a few initial 
sessions using some introductory materials from both books along 
with readings designed to highlight the differences between writing 
a scholarly paper or article and a judicial opinion;69 thereafter, 
weekly reading and class discussion of one to three rewritten 
opinions along with relevant pages from the Chamallas book;70 a 
guest appearance by the author of one of the rewritten opinions in 
U.S. Feminist Judgments to discuss the experience, including 
techniques and challenges; and writing requirements, specifically, 
a first draft and final version of both a feminist judgment for a case 
that the student selects with my approval and a comment on a 
classmate’s feminist judgment. 
For purposes of the writing assignments, I pair students based 
on the subject matter of the cases they choose to rewrite. For 
example, in a recent semester I matched two students who chose 
cases on domestic violence and two students who chose employment 
law cases. Such matching allows students to stay in one substantive 
area for both their feminist judgment and their commentary. I 
encourage students to be ambitious and not necessarily limit 
themselves to cases in which gender might be an explicit issue—
and some of the most fascinating projects have featured cases on 
topics such as campaign finance law, eminent domain, and public 
employee unions.71 
 
 67. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (3d ed. 
2013). 
 68. U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2. 
 69. To contrast judicial opinions, real and rewritten, with scholarly papers, for 
the second or third class meeting of the semester I assign the original, unedited (but 
relatively short) opinions in two cases, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), along with Laura Rosenbury’s feminist 
rewrite of Griswold, supra note 57, and a scholarly examination of Eisenstadt that I 
published. Susan Frelich Appleton, The Forgotten Family Law of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2016). These materials, which include the only ‘real 
opinions’ I assign, invite conversation about both the freedom and constraints of the 
different genres. In addition, Laura Rosenbury’s rewritten Griswold majority 
opinion and my Eisenstadt article exhibit provocative synergies, in part growing out 
of the conversations she and I had while working on these projects. 
 70. CHAMALLAS, supra note 67. 
 71. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (affirming decision 
below by an equally divided court); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 
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I taught this seminar for three fall semesters: Fall 2016, Fall 
2017, and Fall 2019. Beginning in Fall 2019, I supplemented the 
reading with a few excerpts from a new book, Research Handbook 
on Feminist Jurisprudence.72 A guest speaker, although still an 
option for bringing in new perspectives, has become less essential 
for me now that I have my own rewriting experience to recount, 
based on my opinion in Dandridge v. Williams, which I prepared for 
the forthcoming volume in the U.S. Feminist Judgments Series, 
U.S. Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Family Law Cases.73 
Separately from the seminar, in a different course, called  
Regulating Sex: Historical and Cultural Encounters (which also 
emphasizes feminist themes), I have assigned my feminist 
judgment in Dandridge v. Williams.74 Beyond these courses, in 
several faculty presentations to alumni of my law school (which 
recently celebrated the 150th anniversary of its admission of 
women),75 I have talked about the various feminist judgments 
projects, my use of feminist judgments in teaching, and my 




My co-editor Loveday Hodson and I co-teach on an LLM 
module at the University of Leicester called Feminist Perspectives 
on International Law. We have been using a feminist rewritten 
judgment from Feminist Judgments in International Law.77 The 
judgment is Bozkurt.78 It is a rewritten version of the famous Lotus 
 
U.S. 310 (2010); Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 72. RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (Robin West & Cynthia 
Grant Bowman eds., 2019). 
 73. Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding 
constitutionality of mandatory cap on benefits for families with dependent children, 
without regard to family size), with Susan Frelich Appleton, Rewritten Opinion in 
Dandridge v. Williams, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN FAMILY LAW OPINIONS 
(Rachel Rebouché ed., forthcoming 2020) (holding cap unconstitutional). 
 74. See Appleton, Rewritten Opinion in Dandridge v. Williams, supra note 73. 
 75. Karen L. Tokarz, A Tribute to the First Women Law Students, 68 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 1 (1990) (recounting the stories of  Phoebe Couzins and Lemma 
Barkeloo, the school’s first female law students when they began their studies at 
Washington University in 1869); see, e.g., RALPH E. MORROW, WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS: A HISTORY 57 (Tim Fox, Duane Sneddeker, & Herb 
Weitman eds., 1996) (“[T]he law school was the first baccalaureate division of the 
University to admit women and perhaps the first of its kind in the country to do so.”). 
 76. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN FAMILY LAW OPINIONS, supra note 73. 
 77. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2. 
 78. Case C-434/93, Bozkurt v. Staatsecretaris Van Justitte, 1995 E.C.R. I-1475, 
I-1492 (rejecting Turkish national’s right to stay in a European Community state, 
even though worker permanently incapacitated while working for Dutch employer). 
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case, which gets its name from the Turkish ship involved in a 
collision at sea.79 The authors of this judgment are Christine 
Chinkin, Gina Heathcote, Emily Jones and Henry Jones.80 We ask 
our students to read both judgments and then compare and 
contrast. We invite students not only to identify weaknesses and 
strengths but also to question whether they feel Bozkurt, the 
feminist rewritten judgment, is persuasive and valid. In that sense, 
they are judging the rewritten judgment: Is it believable? We chose 
this judgment because it is well known by students of international 
law and it touches upon foundational issues such as sovereignty and 
the power in international relations.81 The feminist rewritten 
judgment offers a different perspective on the dispute and rejects 




I have used U.S. Feminist Judgments83 in a Feminist Legal 
Theory course taught during a two-week May intersession at the 
University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. We read the rewritten 
opinions for the various cases about birth control and abortion 
(Griswold v. Connecticut,84 Roe v. Wade,85 and Planned Parenthood 
 
 79. The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 
10 (Sept. 7) (allowing Turkey to exercise criminal jurisdiction over officers of French 
ship, the S.S. Lotus, that collided with a Turkish ship, the Boz-Kourt, but declining 
to address whether Turkey had the right to assert passive personal jurisdiction over 
the French officers, finding jurisdiction on other grounds). 
 80. See Christine Chinkin et al., Bozkurt Case, aka the Lotus Case (France v. 
Turkey): Ships that Go Bump in the Night, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS INTERNATIONAL, 
supra note 2. 
 81. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 
YALE L.J. 1935, 1950 n.48 (2002) (referring to the “famous S.S. Lotus case”). 
 82. See Chinkin et al., supra note 80. 
 83. U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2. 
 84. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding 
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting contraceptive use by married individuals, 
on the grounds of marital privacy), with Laura A. Rosenbury, Rewritten Opinion in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 57, at 103–13 (reaching same result but using 
reasoning grounded in sexual liberty and equality). 
 85. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring unconstitutional a 
state criminal ban on abortion as a violation of the right to privacy under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and establishing a trimester 
framework that permits increasing restrictions on a woman’s right to choose an 
abortion with each trimester), with Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Rewritten Opinion in 
Roe v. Wade, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 151–67 (reaching same 
result but grounding opinion in both the Due Process Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and rejecting both trimester 
framework and any restrictions on a woman’s right to choose an abortion). 
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of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey86). We also read the feminist 
judgment in Lawrence v. Texas.87 Students are invited to respond to 
the opinions in a daily journal entry, and we then discuss the 
opinions in class. Given that most students in my Feminist Legal 
Theory class have just finished their first year and that 
Constitutional Law is a required second-year course at my 
institution, most students actually read the feminist judgments for 
these cases before they read the actual U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions. That makes for very interesting discussion. Several 
students have told me that they later reread the feminist judgment 
opinions on their own when they covered the cases in their second-




I have used the judgment I co-wrote in the English/Welsh 
project, R v. Dhaliwal,88 in two different types of classes: first, in a 
session on feminist legal methods and theory as part of an optional 
undergraduate module on Contemporary Legal Theory at 
Nottingham University; and second, in seminars in our compulsory 
undergraduate module on Criminal Law at the University of 
Warwick (as many know, law is mostly an undergraduate degree in 
the U.K.). In both instances, students read the original and feminist 
judgments side by side. 
In the first instance, the legal theory course, the aim was to 
question the universality and inevitability of the conclusions in the 
original case, how authorities were interpreted and applied, what 
constitutes relevant information and appropriate expertise, and the 
extent to which the limits of judicial (as opposed to legislative) 
competence is relied upon strategically. We then explored 
 
 86. Compare Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding state restrictions on abortion that required, among other 
things, a mandatory waiting period and parental notification for minors seeking 
abortions), with Lisa R. Pruitt, Rewritten Opinion in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 
365–83 (declaring unconstitutional various restrictions as unreasonable restrictions 
on a woman’s interests in liberty and equal protection). 
 87. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a state anti-
sodomy law on privacy grounds), with Ruthann Robson, Rewritten Opinion in 
Lawrence v. Texas, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 488–503 (reaching 
same result but on grounds of due process and equal protection rights to sexual 
autonomy and sexual equality and apologizing for one of the Court’s prior anti-LGBT 
decisions). 
 88. See Vanessa Munro & Sangeeta Shah, Rewritten Opinion in R v. Dhaliwal, 
in ENGLISH/WELSH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 261–72 (concerning 
liability of husband for suicide of wife). 
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alternative routes through the process using a feminist approach. 
We discussed challenges in securing a ‘better’ outcome in an 
individual case without opening floodgates to potentially less 
desirable outcomes in other contexts.89 
In the second instance, the Criminal Law course, the focus of 
the seminar was liability for manslaughter, causation, and 
constructive liability. The focus was more on the substance of the 
arguments put forward in the feminist judgments, rather than the 
methods, and what those illuminated about the broader approach 
to judging. 
Most recently, as a result of talking with so many people 
around Scotland about the Scottish Feminist Judgments Project, I 
have some more general teaching experience regarding the overall 
project and its aims. We have used the artwork and poetry that 
accompany the project in particular as a route for people to become 
interested and involved in the project.90 In addition, in Fall 2019, 
we undertook a ‘roadshow’ of our project to Scottish universities to 
run bespoke sessions on feminist judging with undergraduate 
students. 
B. Have you had any reactions from colleagues not involved 
with Feminist Judgments projects who are curious about 




I was recently discussing one of my department’s courses with 
the Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies Director and we 
realized that my new course should probably be cross-listed. 
Feminist judgments might also be of interest to other faculty in the 




 89. See R v. Dhaliwal [2006] All ER 1139 (EWCA Crim) (Eng.) (deciding whether 
an abusive husband could be liable for manslaughter when his wife committed 
suicide after a prolonged period of psychological abuse and at a time that pre-dated 
coercive control legislation in England and Wales). 
 90. See, e.g., Artists, SCOTTISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT, https://www
.sfjp.law.ed.ac.uk/artists [https://perma.cc/M3CV-5XQ3] (“This input [of artistic 
collaborators] will allow us to explore how non textual and non academic images and 
interpretations of legal processes and decisions can help us understand the power 
and reach of law, as well as its ethical impact. . . . [T]he artistic outputs . . . engage 
a broader and more diverse audience than we could by producing textual resources 
alone.”). 
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Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon 
 
We have now shared our experience teaching with The Critical 
Judgments Project91 with our group of teachers in Federal 
Constitutional Law, as well as our peers at the University of New 
South Wales, and with other teachers in Australia and across the 
world. We have had a very positive response from all, including 
interest in developing a similar teaching tool in other jurisdictions. 
We have had to work closely with our teachers to support them 
through the exercise, including providing them with detailed 
instructions, and inviting them to sit in on our classes. While 
initially skeptical or nervous, their final responses having taught 
the courses have always reinforced to us the benefit of the exercise. 
For instance, Charlotte Steer, one colleague teaching with the book, 
wrote to us after the class: 
 
I feel like we jumped to a whole different level of engagement 
with [Federal Constitutional Law]—it made me feel a real sense 
of connection with the students and that it truly harnessed 
their enormous brainpower—which is not so obvious when they 
are struggling to master the content of each class. 
. . . . 
I also think that deconstructing a judgment so they can write 
one of their own . . . is such a marvellous way to introduce them 
to the analytical skills we need as practicing lawyers grappling 




 At my home institution, Pace Law School (in the United 
States), I have had several colleagues say of a particular feminist 
judgment, “Oh, that would be interesting to have students read for 
my class,” but I am not aware of any of my immediate institutional 
colleagues who have used a feminist judgment in a traditional first-
year class. I attribute that to the general pressures of doctrinal 
coverage in the first year. Although, I do think that teaching with a 
feminist judgment might be a good way of exposing students to 
different legal philosophies. Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon 
do that with multiple perspectives in the Critical Judgments 
 
 91. CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27. 
 92. E-mail from Charlotte Steer, Teaching Fellow, Faculty of Law, University of 
New South Wales Law, to Gabrielle Appleby, Professor, University of New South 
Wales Law (Apr. 17, 2018, 16:48 AEST) (on file with the recipient). 
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Project.93 By showing that one case can be interpreted through 
multiple theoretical lenses, The Critical Judgments Project shows 
plainly how theory and philosophy matter, and that there is no one 
‘right’ way to approach a case. 
II. Student Responses to Feminist Judgments 
A. How have students responded to reading a feminist 
judgment for the first time? Describe any favorable 
reactions and/or challenges students have had or faced. 
 
Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon  
 
The response we have had from students to the Critical 
Judgments Project exercise in Federal Constitutional Law has been 
overwhelmingly positive, although mixed across a cohort of up to 
450 students in a compulsory course. Some students find the 
exercise extremely challenging, as it is often the first time they are 
asked to take such an overtly critical engagement with the law. For 
instance, Trent Ford, one of our students, was open about his initial 
skepticism to “the idea of a ‘critical judgment,’” that it was 
“somehow breaching the judicial method, or was undignified, for a 
judge to explicitly engage with the sort of references I would use in 
my essays.”94 However, having read through the book’s Capabilities 
Approach chapter,95 he said, “I realised that the Capabilities were 
a useful way of articulating why I already felt that the complainants 
deserved protection and that their needs outweighed Monis’ 
freedom of expression.”96 He would eventually come to see critical 
judgment writing as “a very useful tool,”97 with the potential for 
“[improving] the judicial method, by allowing broader consideration 
of society and the impacts that the decision could have.”98 Critical 
 
 93. CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27. 
 94. E-mail from Trent Ford to Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon, Professors, 
University of New South Wales Law (Apr. 26, 2019, 1:49AM AEST) (on file with the 
recipient). 
 95. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, 
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 69–70 (2006) (describing the “capabilities approach” as “the 
philosophical underpinnings for an account of core human entitlements that should 
be respected and implemented by the governments of all nations, as a bare minimum 
of what respect for human dignity requires.”); see Rosalind Dixon, A Capabilities 
Approach, in CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27, at 135–49. 
 96. E-mail from Trent Ford to Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon, supra note 
94. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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judgment writing also can “upend the orthodox judicial method,” or 
simply serve as one of many tentative considerations to be had when 
a legalist method “runs out.”99 Thinking of critical judgments in this 
way “can make incremental steps to include critical dialogue in real 
judgments seem less of an overreach.”100 
Other students found the exercise liberating from the start, 
having found the strictures of the doctrinal method challenging, but 
previously not lacking the tools for understanding these challenges, 
or to deconstruct and reconstruct it. For instance, one of our 
students, Eloise Kneebone, said: 
 
I was really enthusiastic about the concept. It was the first time 
in any of my law classes that feminist theory had not been an 
‘other’ theory quietly addressed at the end of a theories class, 
as only a critique, and instead put front and centre, as a 
theoretical framework that was used to build a judgment and 
show the potential of feminism to shape the law.101 
 
Another student, Noah Bedford, expressed genuine excitement 
about the exercise: 
 
I believe this excitement was in response to a harsh reality that 
I had never been afforded opportunities to develop my legal 
education through understandings of myself as an Indigenous 
person. That is, understandings of my identity were to date 
seemingly irrelevant to the overwhelming focus of my degree–
the application of ‘objective’ legal doctrine. Gebler’s [sic] 
judgment encouraged me to contemplate how I could use my 
knowledge and experience as an Indigenous legal scholar to 
tear away this veneer of legal objectivity, one that has so often 
served to sanitise the laws [sic] violent operation on my people. 
From here, I could reimagine a new world of Indigenous law 
reform.102 
 
Overwhelmingly, we have found that all students across the 
cohort have engaged with the exercise with an impressive level of 
commitment (this might be related to the fact that we include 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. E-mail from Eloise Kneebone to Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon, 
Professors, University of New South Wales Law (Apr. 23, 2019, 8:24PM AEST) (on 
file with the recipients). 
 102. E-mail from Noah Bedford to Gabrielle Appleby, Professor, University of New 
South Wales Law (Apr. 17, 2019, 2:33AM AEST) (on file with the recipient). “Gebler’s 
judgment” refers to Chapter 6 in the Critical Judgments Project. See Katharine 
Gelber, Critical Race Theory and the Constitutionality of Hate Speech Regulation, in 
CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27, at 88–102. 
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participation in the exercise in our overall class participation mark, 
and there is an optional exam question related to the exercise). This 
level of commitment is demonstrated by Bedford, who indicated 
that he approached the class with some concern, but that “my peers 
handled some areas of scholarship sensitively.”103 He also observed 
that the critical reflections of other students 
 
provided fascinating insights into how the lived experiences 
and ideological positions of my peers interacted with their 
interpretations of the law. At the end of the sharing session, I 
was overwhelmed with the sense of admiration I had for my 




I give my University of Edinburgh students three feminist 
judgments to read alongside the original cases. The cases all deal 
with topics we previously discuss in the course: Ruxton v. Lang, a 
necessity defense case involving domestic violence;105 McKearney v. 
HMA, a rape case;106 and Drury v. HMA, a murder case involving a 
man’s claim of provocation by sexual infidelity on the part of his ex-
partner.107 I ask the students to think about what a feminist legal 
method might do to change the reasoning or outcome of the case, 
what other sorts of feminist goals we might have in re-judging cases 
(such as accessibility of the judgment, and telling the untold 
stories), and what makes a judgment feminist. Some of the students 
have previously taken courses on gender but many have not. It is 
exciting to see how they respond to reading these original and 
rewritten cases side by side—particularly the case of Drury,108 since 
the law on provocation by sexual infidelity in Scotland is 
(incredibly) still in place. 
In teaching, I am also able to use other materials—namely, 
artistic work—to talk about the importance of feminist judgments 
projects. What makes the Scottish Feminist Judgments Project 
different from others thus far is its art strand.109 We engaged eight 
 
 103. E-mail from Noah Bedford to Gabrielle Appleby, supra note 102. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Ruxton v. Lang (1998) SCCR 1 (Scot.). 
 106. McKearney v. HMA (2004) SCCR 251 (Scot.). 
 107. Drury v. HMA (2001) SLT 1013 (Scot.). 
 108. Id. 
 109. But see Julie McCandless, Máiréad Enright & Aoife O’Donohue, Introduction: 
Troubling Judgment, in NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 18 
(“Of particular import to this project was the engagement of poets and visual and 
performance artists.”). 
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Scottish artists to respond to individual cases, or the idea of a 
feminist judgments project more generally, in their own medium.110 
This has led to wonderful creative work including poetry, 
photography, illustrations, a choral work, a filmed theatre piece, 
textile sculptures, and a short story.111 I show the class some of this 
work to further highlight the difference that perspective makes and 
to have a different set of tools to engage them in conversation about 
empathy, ethics, and equality. Watching the students understand 
the difference that asking questions about perspective can make is 




 Generally Leicester students’ reactions have been positive to 
the comparison of the two judgments and they have commented 
favorably on the Bozkurt judgment of the dispute.112 Specifically 
students really enjoy the judgment’s discussion on the gendered 
nature of the state and of western state sovereignty. Students 
always comment on the renaming of the case and the newly founded 
renamed Bozkurt principle putting emphasis on state cooperation 
in the international system as opposed to state consent.113 
They very much enjoy the re-imagining aspect of the case. 
However, recently, one of our groups—which was very small 
in number—was brutally honest and stated that all participants 
found the judgments to be tedious reading and sometimes difficult 
to wade through, preferring the use of more plain-speaking articles 
that highlighted a point or argument to the use of a judgment. As I 
mentioned, this opinion came from a small number of students, but 
since these were law students, it was interesting how adverse some 




 My feminist judgment for the Loving opinion114 takes my 
Mercer students by surprise, because the original U.S. Supreme 
Court opinion ‘got it right’ by eliminating barriers to interracial 
 
 110. See Artists, SCOTTISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 90 
(describing role of artists in Scottish Feminist Judgments Project). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See generally Chinkin, supra note 80. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia, supra note 
55, at 119–36. 
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marriage.115 Prior to reading the rewritten opinion, students see no 
need for it. They are unprepared for the depth of the feminist 
judgment and how it uncovers layers of White supremacy, 
patriarchy, and capitalism not addressed by the Court.116 
The rewritten opinion reframes the issue in the Loving opinion 
as: “Do laws governing marriage violate the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution when they are based on gender classifications 
that serve as a conduit for preferential racial benefits?”117 My 
feminist judgment for the Loving opinion responds in the 
affirmative, stating that “such classifications perpetuate invidious 
racial discrimination based on [W]hite patriarchal privilege.”118 
Consistently students react to the reframed issue and response with 
incredulity, and often explain that their Constitutional Law course 
has not challenged them to think about structural, systemic 
barriers to legal equality. As we delve deeper into the rewritten 
opinion, students express anger and sadness at not being able to 
have open discussions in their required law school courses about 
White supremacy, patriarchy, and capitalism as they relate to 
judicial reasoning and interpretation. Most importantly, students 
in the class see their experiences as members of marginalized 
groups as relevant to resolving heady constitutional issues. They 




In my class at the University of Wisconsin, undergraduate 
students’ responses to the feminist judgments have been largely 
positive. Some students in the Law, Politics, and Society course are 
majoring in the law concentration, but others are philosophers, 
sociologists, or general-credit seeking students who have little or no 
experience with the law. The law concentration students have read 
many of the original opinions, and they largely find the rewrites to 
be more doctrinally coherent, to be based upon clearer moral 
reasoning, and to have better prose than the originals. 
The other students have little experience with legal writing or 
legal institutions, but the feminist rewrites seem to be a fairly 
gentle introduction. The feminist rewrites’ less convoluted legal 
 
 115. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 116. See Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia supra 
note 55, at 119–36. 
 117. Id. at 122. 
 118. Id. at 122 (alteration added). 
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reasoning and more concise connections between doctrine and 
holding, make it easier for students to follow. Some of this ease is 
because the students find the feminist moral foundation more 
intuitive than the moral foundation of the original. A good portion 
is because the rewrites can avoid some of the complexity and 
compromise that arise in forming a majority coalition of judges.119 
In this respect, the feminist rewrites are an excellent introduction 
to legal reasoning. The commentary to each feminist rewrite (which 
includes a summary of the original) is absolutely critical to this 
group of undergraduate students. 
The students at my school hold fairly diverse political beliefs, 
and the course was not advertised as one in feminist jurisprudence, 
so I was a little worried about the reaction to the course’s ‘feminist’ 
focus. However, the plurality of feminist perspectives reflected in 
the feminist judgments opens a non-dogmatic pedagogical space 
that can accommodate such ideological diversity. Feminism turned 





 It is hard to get a sense of reaction in a class of over 200 to the 
requirement that they read an extract from a book that has 
‘feminist’ in its title. I am sure that not all the students do read the 
assigned judgment and commentary—but there are enough that do, 
so that the discussion in class of the new information from the 
readings piques the interest of others. Certainly, I see many shiny, 
enlivened faces from young women who, after the classes, start to 
get a sense of place. 
Although a rewritten judgment is clearly a piece of feminist 
scholarship, I tend to emphasize that any feminist judgment is also 
an exercise in being aware and alive to the possibility of silencing 
of the Other that can occur within the criminal justice system, not 
only for women. A further significant aspect of the Wang case is that 
the defendant was an Asian immigrant woman, who not only 
struggled with the language and culture of her new home, but also 
with knowing who would actually offer her help and a real 
alternative to the violence.120 It was also a case that unfolded in a 
 
 119. The editors acknowledge this factor in the introduction to the U.S. Feminist 
Judgments. See Stanchi, Berger, & Crawford, Introduction, supra note 8, at 9 (“A 
major practical difference between this project and real judging is that our authors 
were not constrained by the necessity of persuading other justices.”). 
 120. See R v. Wang [1990] 2 NZLR 529 (CA). 
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suburb of Christchurch, New Zealand, where in March, 2019, there 
was a shooting at two local mosques.121 The isolation that Wang 
Xiao Jing undoubtedly experienced, we can hope, is not repeated as 




 In my seminar at Washington University in St. Louis, the 
students and I undertake a critical analysis of each of the rewritten 
opinions that I assign. We discuss what impressed us, what 
shortcomings we discovered, and what we might have done 
differently. We also speculate about what might have prompted the 
authors to write a majority opinion, a concurring opinion, or a 
dissenting opinion. We consider the advantages and disadvantages 




 On the whole, students have really embraced the feminist 
judgments. They have described the judgments as empowering, 
challenging, and engaging. Even those who have been more 
reluctant, and have pointed to the ‘jumps in logic’ in the feminist 
rewrite (as the students saw them), when pushed to do so could 
reflect on, and begin to identify, what might also be seen to be jumps 
in logic in the original judgment. I think the ways in which stories 
are presented and packaged differently in many feminist judgments 
have made them particularly powerful teaching tools, even aside 
from the issues around legal framing and interpretation. 
B. How do the students respond to the idea of a ‘feminist 
judgment’—whether the ‘feminist’ part, the ‘judgment’ 
part, or the entire concept? 
 
Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon 
 
 In Australia, we had some skepticism from students about the 
idea of a critical rewriting of a case, either because, as Trent Ford 
 
 121. See, e.g., Charlotte Graham-McLay, Death Toll in New Zealand Mosque 
Shootings Rises to 51, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2IYHLK7  
[https://perma.cc/TW8N-VBWA] (describing aftermath of attacks on New Zealand 
mosques). 
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explained, it was “somehow breaching the judicial method,”122 or 
because, as Noah Bedford explained, the rewriting must still 
“remain[] within the traditional strictures and structures of the 
law.”123 This echoes the comments of two of the authors of the 
queer/post-structural feminist perspective in The Critical 
Judgments Project, Anne MacDuff and Wayne Morgan, that “it is 
not really possible to write a ‘queer’ or ‘poststructural’ judgment. It 
would either not be ‘queer’, or it would not be a ‘judgment’. It is, 
however, possible to write a judgment informed by queer theory and 
poststructural feminism.”124 
For other students, the writing of the critical judgment was 
exactly what gave the exercise its value. For instance, student 
Amelia Loughland reflected on reading her rewritten judgment 
taking an intersectional lens. She said that this method 
 
was the most enriching way to unsettle the otherwise positivist 
conviction of my legal education that there is a ‘correct’ answer 
to legal questions. In this way, the exercise helped reinforce just 
how deep the (masculine) norm of detached impartiality as the 
standard for judicial excellence had been ingrained in my 
reading of law. While I had already appreciated this idea from 
other critical theory reading, I think the power of the critical 
judgment[s] projects is its explicit co-opting of the judgment 
format, which forces you to become cognisant of its difference 




 Working with something explicitly labeled a ‘feminist’ 
judgment opens the door to having a conversation about the role of 
perspective in judicial decision making. For the most part, I think 
students intuit that a judge’s individual perspective or theoretical 
commitments inform the way the judge decides the case. Depending 
on the stage in their legal education, students may not have the 
vocabulary to describe what they see as, for example, a ‘law and 
economics perspective’126 or an ‘originalist approach to 
 
 122. E-mail from Trent Ford to Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon, supra note 
94. 
 123. E-mail from Noah Bedford to Gabrielle Appleby, supra note 102. 
 124. Anne Macduff & Wayne Morgan, Queer Theory and Poststructuralist 
Feminism, in CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27, at 73. 
 125. E-mail from Amelia Loughland to Gabrielle Appleby, Professor, University 
of New South Wales Law (Apr. 20, 2019, 1:59 AM AEST) (on file with the author). 
 126. See, e.g., Carole M. Billiet, Formats for Law and Economics in Legal 
Scholarship: Views and Wishes from Europe, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1485 (providing an 
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constitutional interpretation,’127 but my U.S. students readily 
accept the notion that perspective matters and that feminism is just 
another perspective. What seems less clear to them is whether a 
commitment to feminism leads to a certain result. If my experience 
in working on the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project is any guideline, 
I would say that there is no such thing as a singular ‘feminist’ 
approach to decision making (but rather, that there are multiple 
ideas that can be drawn from feminisms plural).128 Feminist 
judging happens against the backdrop of this discernible body of 
feminist legal scholarship, informed by distinct methods and 
themes. But a ‘feminist’ perspective does not dictate a particular 




The students in my classes have reacted positively, but that is 
not surprising, given that they chose to enroll in an elective course 
with explicit feminist content. They have described the experience 




 We share the same experience of positive reviews, probably 
because our course has explicit feminist content, like Susan’s. The 
 
overview of ways that law and economics approaches and concepts have been 
adopted by European law schools and legal scholars). 
 127. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT 
HAS READ THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2019) (describing the historical trajectory 
of judicial efforts to translate the U.S. Constitution to contemporary cases). See also 
Law to Fact: Prof. Lawrence Lessig Discusses His Book, Fidelity and Constraint, LAW 
TO FACT (May 14, 2019), https://www.buzzsprout.com/138309/1131005 
[https://perma.cc/ZY55-9VZP] (discussing how judicial interpretation of U.S. 
Constitutional rights has evolved). 
 128. See Stanchi, Berger, & Crawford, Introduction, supra note 8, at 3–4 (“[W]hen 
we refer to feminist methods or feminist reasoning processes, we mean ‘methods’ and 
‘reasoning processes’ plural, all the while acknowledging that there is a rich and 
diverse body of scholarship that has flourished under the over-arching label ‘feminist 
legal theory.’”). 
 129. On the course evaluations (which students complete anonymously), one 
student in the seminar in Fall 2016 wrote: “I have recommended this class to 
multiple classmates for next year. It was well paced and intellectually stimulating. 
I often had before and after class discussions with classmates and other law students 
about the subject because of the questions posed by the opinions, professor, and 
classmates. The papers are demanding, but very interesting. Writing as a judge was 
empowering.” Washington University in St. Louis School of Law Instructor Report 
for Susan Appleton, FL2016W.W76.829S.01-Feminist Theories, Feminist 
Judgments (Appleton) (on file with the author). 
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students seem to welcome the presence of a feminist judgment as 
another way of using feminist methodology in a ‘real world’ 
situation, like an actual legal judgment. It seems attractive to 
students because it is a practical application of feminist theories 
and something they can try for themselves when they choose their 
own judgment to rewrite as part of preparation for this particular 
class. Not all our students found the task of rewriting their own 
judgment to be an experience they enjoyed. Some found it to be a 
bit of an uphill climb requiring more reflection than they could 
accomplish in a limited time. It might be useful to consider having 
the task of judgment writing spread out over a longer period of time 
or by groups of students, just as we did it in groups or chambers for 
our edited collection.130 
III. Pedagogical and Student Development Goals Achieved 
with Feminist Judgments 
A. What might teaching with feminist judgments accomplish 
that is not readily achieved with published, decided cases 




 Working with feminist judgments can open a door for students 
who have come to dis-identify with the substance of law or who feel 
alienated and excluded by its formal structures and language. First, 
feminist judgments demand more of the law. Because they are 
justice-serving, they exemplify what the law is capable of 
accomplishing, reaching far beyond, many times, where the law 
currently stands. A rewritten feminist judgment demonstrates that 
law as presented in casebooks is not inevitable, but often the 
product of a judicial author’s choice of analytic framework, limited 
openness to considering context, and inclination to adhere to 
formalist categories of law. Recognizing that law does present 
opportunities to make other choices can be both revelatory and 
inspiring to a student who feels disillusioned by law’s inherent 
conservatism, but sees in a feminist judgment law’s potential. 
Second, feminist judgments’ frequent use of narrative and reliance 
on language that is direct, forthright, and accessible can be more 
 
 130. See FEMINIST JUDGMENTS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2 (organizing 
contributors to work together in different “chambers”). 
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inviting to students who find the forms of law confusing or 
unwieldy. 
Ruthann Robson’s rewritten Lawrence v. Texas131 is a feminist 
judgment that can reach students alienated by the law’s substance 
or its form. Substantively, the rewritten version pushes past 
prevailing doctrine by centering the concept of sexual autonomy 
over the more conventional use of privacy justifications.132 The 
judgment also highlights, and apologizes for, the corrosive human 
effects of criminalizing same-sex activity—the law Lawrence 
abrogated.133 This willingness to address law’s impact directly and 
powerfully shows the potential for law to be more inclusive and 




 I think Andrea summed it up well: feminist judgments teach 
students that law is neither neutral nor inevitable. Of course, many 
students realize law is not neutral, but all too often they do believe 
outcomes are inevitable given existing precedent, etc. Students also 
fail to see the creative potential within law. I have found that 
students who have read feminist judgments begin to see that law, 
like so much of our reality, is constructed. As Elisabeth said, this 
kind of lesson can be both troubling and liberating. Much of 
students’ sense of liberation comes from the realization that they 
can—and must—have a voice in constructing law and in shaping 
the legal theories and doctrines that will address the pressing 
issues of the next hundred or more years. Finally, the realization 
that law can be a creative profession comes as a great relief to 
students who feel stifled by the traditional law school classroom and 




 As Andrea and Pam noted, reading and writing feminist 
judgments help students to see that nothing in law is inevitable. 
Each week that my seminar meets, we enter an ‘alternative 
universe’ that becomes as plausible as the one we ordinarily inhabit 
 
 131. Ruthann Robson, Rewritten Opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, in U.S. FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 488–503. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 501 (“It is appropriate that we not only overrule Bowers v. Hardwick, 
but that we apologize. We regret our decision in Bowers v. Hardwick because its 
consequences, both direct and indirect, have been devastating.”). 
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in law school and in the legal profession. Put differently, studying 
feminist judgments makes clear that every opinion students read in 
law school or will encounter thereafter rests on a particular 
perspective. For the long term, moreover, some of today’s students 
will become tomorrow’s judicial clerks and judges—and they might 
well bring to these roles insights gained from studying feminist 
judgments. 
In addition, I have found that a seminar centered on feminist 
judgments offers several advantages compared to seminars built 
around the many other topics I have used over the years. First, we 
can have much to discuss in class with very manageable reading 
assignments. Second, I am now convinced that writing a feminist 
judgment (although a ‘fictional’ exercise) offers students an 
experience of greater practical value than writing a traditional, 
scholarly seminar paper. Finally, the commentaries that the 
students produce for my seminar become useful writing samples, 
especially when a prospective employer wants something short that 




 I agree with Andrea, Pam, and Susan about feminist 
judgments’ highlighting the reality of the law not being neutral or 
free from being gendered. I would also add that students seem to 
enjoy the story of the individual with whom they can identify, and 
they are drawn into the issues of context and their own sense of 
justice through the story of the individual or group. Whether it is 
the right to choose to wear a headscarf, the right to choose one’s 
gender identity, or the potential to review a Security Council 
resolution, all these examples have a context too often ignored in a 
traditional judgment.134 But when examined in a feminist 
judgment, the judgment can bring a different perspective on what 
the outcome can be. Student engagement with the context of the 
legal issues creates a broader legal critique and, as Susan 




 134. See Rewritten Opinion in Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS 
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2; Rewritten Opinion in Christine Goodwin v. the United 
Kingdom, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2; and Rewritten 
Opinion in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States, in  FEMINIST JUDGMENTS 
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2. 
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Elisabeth McDonald 
 
 As we all know from re-imagining the law in the way that 
rewriting judgments allows us to do, the very powerful message is 
that alternative legitimate, thoughtful, well-reasoned decisions 
that draw on the available precedent are possible on the same facts. 
And the decision can legitimately be the opposite to the original one. 
That I think is the key—this is not rewriting with the benefit of new 
awareness, better science, or changing social mores—but rather an 
exercise that proves a wholly different outcome could have been 
reached. That is an immensely significant (and challenging) 
message—and is clearly and compellingly delivered by all the 
feminist judgments collections. I am sure this is a troubling concept 
for very many law students who do not like to contemplate the 
option of not just one answer. “What will I write in the exam?” they 
wonder. Many will not take this lesson into their other studies and 
their careers in the law, or at least not immediately. While it is a 
troubling message, it is also a validating and liberating one. 
Arguing for changing an existing law or approach, which many 
graduates will do in their careers, knowing that there was never 




 As I was drafting my rewritten opinion, the feminist judgment 
in Loving,135 for U.S. Feminist Judgments, I was teaching a course 
in Critical Race Theory/Critical Race Feminism at Mercer Law 
School. One afternoon when I was writing in my office at school, one 
of the students knocked on my door for an impromptu meeting. I 
asked him to wait while I was finishing up a thought. This 
particular student, always intellectually inquisitive, began to read 
over my shoulder. The sentences I had written were my reframing 
of the issue for the U.S. Supreme Court. When I noticed he was 
reading, I turned in my chair to witness his eyes grow wide and his 
hand rise to cover his mouth. He said to me “Professor M-C! I had 
no idea we could do this!”136 My student is an African-American 
male. By “we” he meant African-Americans; by “this,” he meant act 
 
 135. See Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia, supra 
note 55, at 119–36. 
 136. See e-mail from David Stokes to Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Professor, UIC John 
Marshall Law School & Mercer University School of Law (July 1, 2019, 19:11 EDT) 
(on file with the author) (confirming details of interaction in Professor McMurtry-
Chubb’s office). 
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as autonomous knowledge producers to push for inclusive inquiry 
in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.137 
This interaction epitomizes the accomplishment of the 
feminist judgment projects. Instead of relegating scholarly and 
practical inquiry of White supremacy, patriarchy, 
heteronormativity, capitalism, and imperialism to upper-division 
electives, the projects provide vehicles for integrating the same into 
the required law school curriculum. As long as our engagement with 
issues about race, class, gender, and sexuality in the law school 
curriculum remains separate from the ‘real’ law school classes, our 
disjointed approach to teaching about them sends the message that 
these issues are tangential and therefore optional in legal 
education. The strategies that the projects employ are key to 
making social justice a priority for law schools, law students, and 




 For me, the beauty of teaching with feminist judgments is the 
applied and concrete nature of the process. The close reading of the 
same case from different perspectives really calls into question the 
decisions that are made, the silences, the sleights of hand. These 
can be talked about in other texts, of course (and often are), but 
there is something about the very applied and specific nature of it 
in feminist judgments that really engages students and others. 
B. In using feminist judgments in your teaching, what has 
been your goal? Do you think you accomplished it? How 




 As a general matter, I tend to emphasize a set of skills that 
one develops with a liberal arts education such as critical thinking, 
writing, and synthesis, rather than content knowledge. In the 
undergraduate course on Law, Politics, and Society, we use 
particular laws and court holdings to start a dialogue with social 
theory and normative theory (in this class, feminism). We pay 
attention to the structure and tone of writing and think about how 
moral language grounds different types of decisions and how that 
language resonates or does not resonate with different audiences. 
 
 137. See id. 
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Students’ final papers suggest that the course refines students’ 
moral reasoning, attunes them to rhetorical style, and helps them 




 I have taught several of the rewriting opinions from U.S. 
Feminist Judgments in my judicial opinion writing course. We read 
the feminist judgment side by side with the original. One of my 
explicit goals, described in the syllabus, is to teach students to think 
critically about the original decision and how it forms and shapes 
our cultural attitudes toward justice. My other goal is to show 
students, in judicial language, how an opinion oriented primarily 
around social justice looks and sounds. That is, the opinion would 
look and sound like a ‘real’ opinion, but advance the law in a way 
that students might not have conceived by reading just the original. 
It is, of course, hard to measure whether students ‘get it,’ but I think 
they do, based on listening to them and reading their own 
judgments later. 
I watch so many of my students be astonished and heartened 
by seeing a judicial opinion written to achieve social justice. I see 
them try to do this in their own writing, in a way that I think would 
not have been possible without the model of the feminist judgments. 
This is particularly important to my students who come from 
backgrounds traditionally not represented in the judiciary—for 
example, African-American students, students from poor or 
working-class families, and students who are members of sexual 
minorities. I have had more than one student tell me how freeing, 
empowering, and eye-opening it was to see their identities 
addressed and respected in legal reasoning. In my view, that 
validation alone proves the worth of assigning the feminist 
judgments. 
With the guided research student, my goal was to show the 
student how to make a credible argument that fetal burial laws 
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.138 This 
was a somewhat unique take on the Hyde Amendment that Leslie 
Griffin masterfully articulates in her feminist judgment.139 Reading 
 
 138. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting the 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). See also 
Fernandez, supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing law passed by the 
Texas state legislature but invalidated by a federal court that required burial or 
cremation of fetal tissue). 
 139. Leslie C. Griffin, Rewritten Opinion in Harris v. MacRae, in U.S. FEMINIST 
38 Law & Inequality [Vol. 38:1 
Leslie’s judgment showed me that the Establishment Clause was 
underutilized in the context of abortion laws. Leslie’s judgment is 
also astonishing in its use of supporting materials to show the clear 
religious basis for the law. It was so helpful to the student to see 




 With the Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions 
book,140 my co-editor Tony Infanti and I really wanted to challenge 
the notion that statutory interpretation and application are 
mechanical exercises. In thinking about whether a particular item 
is tax deductible under U.S. law, for example, some items are 
crystal clear. A taxpayer may, for example, deduct all “ordinary and 
necessary expenses paid or incurred” in carrying on a trade or 
business.141 But what exactly is “ordinary”? What is “necessary”? 
The statute does not answer these questions. 
The same is true with medical expenses. U.S. taxpayers are 
allowed in some circumstances to deduct expenses for “medical care 
of the taxpayer.”142 But what constitutes “medical care”? In 
O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner, the United States Tax Court took 
up that question in the context of gender confirmation surgery and 
reached different results than did our colleague David Cruz in his 
feminist judgment.143 The feminist judgment uses a radically 
different vocabulary even to discuss the basic facts of the case. 
David Cruz elegantly begins his feminist judgment with the words, 
“Rhiannon O’Donnabhain is a taxpayer.”144 The original opinion 
struggled in deciding what pronouns to use for the taxpayer, even 
though the taxpayer herself had been clear in all of her filings.145 
 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 247–56. 
 140. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS, supra note 21. 
 141. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2017). 
 142. 26 U.S.C. § 213(a) (2017). 
 143. Compare O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010), acq., 2011-47 I.R.B. 
(permitting some deductions associated with taxpayer’s gender confirmation surgery 
and associated transition care, on grounds that the taxpayer suffered from the 
“disease” of gender identity disorder, while also stumbling over pronoun usage and 
discomfort with discussing transgender issues), with David B. Cruz, Rewritten 
Opinion in O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX 
OPINIONS, supra note 21, at 274–96 (2017) (permitting all deductions associated with 
taxpayer’s gender confirmation surgery and associated transition care, cautiously 
adopting the “disease” label in order to secure the taxpayer’s right to a deduction but 
writing with noticeable respect for the taxpayer). 
 144. David B. Cruz, Rewritten Opinion in O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, supra note 
143, at 274. 
 145. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 35 n.3 (explaining in a clumsy manner and 
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The feminist rewrite does not. Nothing about the way we talk about 
the law or make legal decisions—whether the common law or 
statutory law—is preordained. Down to the pronouns a judge uses, 




 Frankly, one of my goals in assigning cases from U.S. 
Feminist Judgments is simply to be an evangelist for the projects. 
Of course, there are sound pedagogical and social justice-related 
reasons. I second the comments of Kathryn, Bridget, and Ross. That 
being said, one of my principal goals is to let students know about 
the global feminist judgments projects. Someday our students will 
be lawyers and judges, and as the volumes in the projects increase 
(more subjects and more countries),146 there will be a body of 
creative scholarship that may inform the arguments they make or 
adopt. 
C. In your experience, can feminist judgments be a vehicle 
for teaching knowledge (i.e., substance and procedure) 
and/or expanding students’ understanding of the law? 
Or a vehicle for teaching skills (e.g., ascertaining relevant 




 Teaching from feminist judgments can increase students’ 
knowledge base, in the sense that feminist approaches can both 
expand their understanding of what unlawful discrimination is—as 
a matter of substantive law—and  demonstrate—from an 
evidentiary or lawyering standpoint—how discrimination can be 
established. For example, Martha Chamallas’s rewritten 
concurrence in U.S. Feminist Judgments in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins connects sex stereotyping in the workplace to gender 
discrimination actionable under Title VII.147 It uses expert social 
science evidence that was available to the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the original case to examine stereotypes. The opinion demonstrates 
how stereotypes operate in workplace culture to devalue women’s 
 
‘justifying’ use of a female pronoun in referring to the taxpayer). 
 146. See supra note 21 (describing forthcoming subject-matter specific volumes in 
the U.S. Feminist Judgments Series). 
 147. See Martha Chamallas, Rewritten Opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 345–60. 
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contributions and hinder their advancement in an organization.148 
By making social science central to its reasoning, and focusing on 
context (here, workplace practices), this feminist judgment develops 
relevant evidence of the day-to-day, insidious ways in which 
workplace discrimination often biases assessment of female 
employees and keeps women in subordinate positions. Similarly, 
Ann Bartow’s dissent in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School 
District effectively uses an expanded factual narrative to reframe a 
male high school teacher’s sexual ‘relationship’ with a female 
student as sexual abuse and harassment that meets the standard 
of sex discrimination actionable under Title IX.149 
Both Martha’s and Ann’s opinions rely on identified feminist 
methods (use of social science and narrative) to illuminate the 
corrosive realities of sex discrimination, and both would support 
learning in classes on civil rights law or sex discrimination. But, in 
their attention to facts and context, these approaches point as well 
to the lawyering work needed, including fact investigation and 
analysis, and fact-based advocacy, to develop and prove the 
elements of sex discrimination. So I believe that feminist judgments 
also can be helpful in skills-based classes for sensitizing students to 




 In the tax classroom, feminist judgments can be a vehicle for 
teaching both substantive knowledge and the importance of 
perspective in statutory interpretation. The case I mentioned 
earlier that addresses the deductibility of expenses for gender 
confirmation surgery can be read and understood by anyone, 
regardless of familiarity with the tax law.150 And by reading the 
case—either the feminist judgment or the original opinion—in 
connection with the statute, one can begin to pick apart the prongs 
of the statute. “[M]edical care” means amounts paid for the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of a disease, or 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Compare Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (holding 
that teenage girl had no cause of action against the school district after being raped 
by a teacher repeatedly over a period of two years, on the grounds that the district 
had no actual notice of the actions of the teacher), with Ann Bartow, Rewritten 
Opinion in Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, 
supra note 2, at 430–46 (writing dissenting opinion that would permit recovery to 
teenage victim because actual notice standard allows schools to fail to investigate 
allegations of teacher crime or misbehavior). 
 150. See supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text. 
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for the purposes of affecting any structure of functioning of the 
body.151 In rewriting the opinion, David Cruz had to make the 
difficult decision of whether he was going to associate the “disease” 
label with the transgender taxpayer, and risk pathologizing her in 
order to have the payments associated with gender confirmation 
surgery qualify as “medical expenses.”152 So in teaching with the 




 As Andrea and Bridget said, the feminist judgments serve as 
teaching tools for both substance and skills. Each commentary and 
opinion provides additional context and nuance for the substance 
and procedure in each case. Each also expands students’ 
understanding of how legal reasoning and analysis are malleable 
constructs that can be used in the service of justice. Drafters of the 
rewritten opinions play with narrative, point of view, and otherwise 
resituate the subject of the opinion. By employing these strategies, 
they shift perspective on whom and what is important in the 
opinion, as well as on whom and what is at issue. For example, the 
feminist rewrite of Loving opinion is, in part, an indictment of 
marriage as an exclusive patriarchal structure that perpetuates 
White supremacy and capitalism.153 It goes beyond an explanation 
of Virginia as a bad actor, an individualist view of race and gender 
discrimination, to impugning an institution that is arguably 
patriarchal, White supremacist, and capitalist in origin and 
tradition. 
Likewise, each opinion invites students to reconsider how each 
part of a particular genre (in the Loving case, the briefs working 
behind the scenes and judicial opinions that address them) advance 
a litigator’s theory of the case and oppose seemingly innocuous, 
neutral reasoning and analytical structures. By examining how 
each rewritten opinion reframes the issues, constructs new 
analytical frameworks, and uses those frameworks to build 
arguments using facts previously deemed irrelevant, students 
 
 151. See 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2017) (defining “medical care”) (alteration 
added). 
 152. David B. Cruz, Rewritten Opinion in O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, supra note 
143, at 284 (“Were we assured that transgender persons would be entitled to deduct 
from their income the often high expenses that transition care can necessitate, we 
would be more moved by the concern not to stigmatize them with an ‘illness’ 
label . . . But we are not necessarily the last word here.”). 
 153. Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia, supra note 
55, at 119–36. 
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 Like Andrea, Bridget, and Teri, I think the feminist 
judgments are vehicles for teaching substance and skills. Those 
things go together. My emphasis is really on each of these 
components in turn—so in the theory class, the emphasis was on 
methods, and in the criminal law class, it was much more on 
substantive concepts.154 But the two obviously cannot be divorced. 
It is from the interaction between them that the most powerful 
discussions often emerged. So far the reactions to the artwork in the 
Scottish project has been really strong.155 This is something that I 
intend to use much more in my teaching to get students to think in 
different registers about the process of judging, feminist judging, 
and feminism. 
D. From your perspective, how does becoming acquainted 
with the Feminist Judgments projects or any particular 




 For me, using feminist judgments and the art that has been 
created as a response to feminist judgments has a real role to play 
in cultivating empathy and a sense of the “ethical imagination” in 
students.156 Hopefully they will take this forward into their 
professional lives. The judgments and art enable students to see 
more clearly the ethical complexities of trying to understand the 
whole range of human experience within law, and to understand the 
impact of the law in a more grounded way. The judgments and art 
encourage students to challenge the supposed neutrality and 
objectivity of law, to see the contingent nature of law, and to 
undertake their own creative interpretations of law more mindfully. 
Being exposed to critical projects such as feminist judgments 
projects gives students—and everyone else who engages with them, 
including the feminist judges themselves—more tools with which to 
 
 154. See supra Part I.A (comments of Vanessa Munro). 
 155. See supra notes 109–111 and accompanying text. 
 156. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING HUMANITY: A CLASSICAL DEFENSE 
OF REFORM IN LIBERAL EDUCATION (1997) (on intersection of ethics and law) and 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 
(2004) (same). 
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develop professional and life skills that can make us better lawyers, 
teachers, and friends. 
 
Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon 
 
 In the first chapter of The Critical Judgments Project, we 
write that students must learn the craft of positivist-based legal 
methods, but doing so is not enough.157 We also want students to 
graduate from law school with an ability to identify and assess the 
influence of personal, social, political, and economic factors in legal 
methods, and to interrogate assumptions within legal rules, 
institutions, and processes. We emphasize that we want all law 
graduates to develop these capacities and that they will all go on to 
be intellectual leaders of the community. A capacity for critical 
thinking is vital to engage with political and legal institutions and 
take the law forward into the future. 
In this respect, we are buoyed by the responses of our students 
to the exercise. For instance, Ganur Maynard, an Indigenous 
student, was skeptical at first about the benefits of the exercise, but 
concluded that as a result of the exercise, he found that his 
conception of “proper” or “correct” legal analysis necessarily 
excludes other perspectives, in the exact manner against which 
James Boyd White and Robin West exhort.158 
Maynard suggests that his own reaction may signify “a 
broader problem with the practice of law and the legal profession 
more generally.”159 
Noah Bedford reflected on the value of the exercise to his legal 
education with a visual image: 
 
 
 157. Appleby & Dixon, Critical Thinking in Constitutional Law and Monis v. The 
Queen, supra note 35, at 1 (“Law school must expose students to the concepts of 
indeterminacy and subjectivity in judicial decision-making . . . It must teach 
students to identify and assess the influence of personal, social, political and 
economic factors in the development of legal doctrine.”). 
 158. E-mail from Ganur Maynard to Gabrielle Appleby, Professor, University of 
New South Wales Law (Apr. 1, 2017, 2:53 AM) (on file with the authors). See also 
JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF LAW 
33–34 (1985) (“[L]ike any rhetorician, the lawyer must always start by speaking the 
language of his or her audience . . . [T]he lawyer’s work has a second essential 
element, the creative process . . . . The third aspect of legal rhetoric is what might be 
called its ethical or communal character, or its socially constitutive nature.”), and 
ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 217 (1997) (“[L]aw and literature scholarship is 
often moved by a passion for justice that is explicitly conjoined with a distrust of 
dominant, property-obsessed conceptions for virtue. . . .Feminist writing reveals the 
same ambivalence.”). 
 159. E-mail from Ganur Maynard to Gabrielle Appleby, supra note 158. 
44 Law & Inequality [Vol. 38:1 
Instead of swimming around the surface of settled doctrine, 
which has been the overwhelming experience during my time 
at law school, the critical judgments exercise made me dive deep 
into examining how different values and ideologies can inform 
what rules ends [sic] up bubbling to the surface. After the 
exercise, I felt as though my understanding of the law, a system 
that I may well spend the rest of my life participating in, had 
truly expanded.160 
 
Student Eloise Kneebone said that the critical judgments 
exercise fueled her interest in judges as individuals: 
 
I think the critical judgments exercise gave me an appreciation 
of the impact of personal experiences that lie beneath seemingly 
objective or neutral judgments, and an appreciation of how the 
experiences of a privileged few with similar life experiences has 




 The tangible existence of a bound, hardcover book titled 
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States 
Supreme Court (and similar titles from other countries) in a sea of 
ubiquitous law school casebooks is not to be underestimated. By 
titles like this, students’ suspicions are confirmed that perhaps they 
are not receiving a legal education that interrogates inequality. The 
feminist judgments projects provide them a path to do so. Legal 
education normalizes as ‘neutral’ Western epistemologies—ways of 
knowing—that are White, male, and heteronormative. Students 
who are social justice minded when they enter law school come into 
direct conflict with these ways of knowing, which often results in 
their feeling inadequate and demoralized. As Kathryn said, the 
feminist judgments projects help students—especially those 
marginalized by race, class, gender, and sexuality—to see 
themselves in the law school curriculum, body of court 
jurisprudence (including the U.S. Supreme Court), and the legal 
profession as legitimate sources of knowledge and knowledge 
production. The projects reaffirm for students that their 
commitment to social justice is possible through the skillset that 
they are being taught and reintroduce them to what is possible. 
 
 160. E-mail from Noah Bedford to Gabrielle Appleby, supra note 102. 
 161. E-mail from Eloise Kneebone to Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon, supra 
note 101. 
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When students see themselves in what they aspire to be, as 
reflected in the curriculum, they are empowered to continue boldly 
toward their vision for their careers, rather than being discouraged 
from pursuing what they envision. The rewritten opinions serve as 
a touchstone—a validation of a journey towards justice advocacy. In 
studying them, students not only ask questions about their creation 
(the impetus for the rewritten opinion), but also about their creators 
(the legal scholars who wrote the rewritten opinions), and the 
subjects of their creation (the original litigants and their attorneys). 
Students’ study of the rewritten opinions normalizes social justice 




 I think this question is so important. It is the critical 
foundation of how we see law training. For literally a century, we 
have focused on doctrine, doctrine, doctrine. This is so misguided in 
my view. Yes, doctrine is important—but who among us would 
recommend that newly-minted lawyers give advice to a client, write 
a brief, or go to an oral argument solely on the strength of the 
doctrine they learned in law school? None of us, I imagine. Lawyers 
have to research and update the law, of course. So, why not make 
substantial room for critical thinking in law school—not just in 
seminars, but in the first year, in those doctrinal core courses? To 
me, this is essential to students’ professional development. We need 
to graduate students who not only know the basics of the law 
(doctrine), but also how to use the law, how to be critical of it, and 
how to change it when it needs to be changed. In other words, we 
need to teach students not just what the law is, which is so limiting, 
but what the law could be; its vast, and largely unrealized, potential 
for social change. Too often, I hear students grumble about needing 
to know the black-letter law, as if that is all they are in law school 
to learn. We are at fault for that grumbling because we are not 
adequately communicating to students what it is they need to learn 
to be excellent lawyers. To me, feminist judgments are tools that 
help us re-envision what law school is and should be. 
Another very important part of student professional 
development is the ability to communicate with and understand 
people of all different backgrounds. We are doing a pretty poor job 
of teaching students this essential skill. Those who have the 
opportunity to participate in clinics (and choose to do so) are being 
taught this critical skill, but this group is usually a fraction of the 
students enrolled in (U.S.) law schools. Because legal doctrine, both 
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decisional and statutory, represents the perspective of an 
exceedingly narrow segment of U.S. society, it is our duty to teach 
other perspectives—if for no other reason than our students will 
certainly have clients with those perspectives. If you read Clark 
Cunningham’s article that likens the lawyer to a translator,162 you 
can see the great divide between doctrine and the lived experience 
of so many people whose daily lives depend on lawyers. When 
lawyers have no exposure to perspectives other than those of the 
creators of the doctrine, lawyers are tone-deaf to their clients’ 
problems and concerns. Feminist judgments allow students to see 
other perspectives on the law, which for many students is truly 




 Lawyers in formation need to see demonstrations of law 
operating in service of justice, and feminist judgments projects 
provide models of an explicitly justice-oriented approach to law. The 
disparity between the law as it is and as it could be is sobering, to 
echo Kathryn, but also galvanizing. Exposure to feminist judgments 
projects gives students a way of thinking about legal institutions— 
the potential for judges and legislators to move the law, with 
scholar-advocates, such as the feminist judgments authors, pointing 
the way. I think exposure to exemplars of how the law can be 
imagined and articulated differently is essential for students to 
avoid the disillusionment or, worse, cynicism, that can take over 
when their sense of the law is limited to a body of rules that seems 
unfair and unresponsive to changing needs and circumstances. 
Feminist judgments are also powerful reminders of the 
importance of taking creative approaches to legal analysis. Asking 
oneself, ‘What if the law were different?’—drawing on one of 
educator Jenerra Williams’ generative habits of mind163—is how 
fresh perspectives of law begin to take root. Animated by that 
 
 162. Clark D. Cunningham, Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: 
Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992). 
 163. Jenerra Williams, The Struggle for Justice: U.S. History Through the Eyes of 
African Americans, in TEACHING IN THEMES: AN APPROACH TO SCHOOLWIDE 
LEARNING, CREATING COMMUNITY, & DIFFERENTIATING INSTRUCTION 61, 62 
(Deborah Meier, Matthew Knoester, & Katherine Clunis D’Andrea eds., 2015) 
(naming “Evidence, Connections, Viewpoint, Conjecture, Relevance” as the five 
“essential habits [of mind] to develop in becoming a true critical thinker and 
productive member of a democratic society”). Deriving from educator Deborah 
Meier’s inventory of habits, “Conjecture” incorporates this question about “what if.” 
Deborah Meier, Democracy at Risk, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, May 2009, at 47, 48. 
2020] Teaching with Feminist Judgments 47 
question, the feminist judgment authors model creative analyses 
that our students can learn from and seek to internalize as part of 
their professional mindset. 
Further, feminist judgments embody an interdisciplinary 
approach to law that legal education generally undervalues. To 
guard against a further narrowing of the legal mind, law schools 
should encourage (if not require) students to examine how law 
works in conjunction with other disciplines. Exposure to feminist 
judgments can help students understand law in a broader frame 
and to appreciate how access to other domains of knowledge and 




I think most students tend to get in a routine with the 
categories and discourse they use in both everyday life and their 
professional careers. I think feminist judgments provide a nice 
introduction to alternative modes of thinking about the social world. 
My students will be able to transfer this more ‘critical’ point of view 
into other aspects of their lives, including their professional careers. 
I teach two standard undergraduate courses in constitutional 
law: structure and civil liberties. Mostly, I focus in these courses on 
mastering the material and legal writing, but part of the craft of law 
is recognizing how a decision could have been different, and what 
those differences might have meant for the organization of society. 
The feminist judgments make demonstrating of these differences 
much easier to do. The feminist rewrites of Roe164 and Casey,165 in 
particular, are highly effective articulations of alternative 
perspectives. I also think the Bradwell/Slaughter-House 
combination166 provides a stark and moving contrast to how 
different a direction the U.S. Supreme Court might have oriented 
 
 164. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 166. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (denying Myra Bradwell admission to 
the bar, on the grounds that the right to obtain a law license is not protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (holding that 
state law creating a monopoly for a single slaughterhouse does not violate Thirteenth 
or Fourteenth Amendment). But see Phyllis Goldfarb, Rewritten Opinion in Bradwell 
v. Illinois, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 60–77 (finding equal 
protection right to obtain law license and distinguishing the Slaughter-House Cases, 
because Bradwell, unlike the butchers, otherwise had no right to pursue her 
profession). 
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 By studying the feminist judgments, students can begin to 
evaluate the relative persuasiveness that different arguments have, 
even if the arguments are grounded in the same law. Also, some of 
the judgments challenge us to think about what ‘counts’ as part of 
a legal argument. In Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions, 
for example, our colleague Mary Louise Fellows rewrites an iconic 
U.S. case involving business deductions.168 She makes an extended 
analogy to the historic distinction between the commercial 
marketplace and the private sphere of the home by referring to 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein.169 Fellows is not suggesting that 
Frankenstein is legal authority, but rather that the story can frame 
commerce in a way that is helpful for interpreting and applying the 
tax rules that apply to business deductions. I find the analogy to be 
incredibly creative—something I would have never considered, but 
for encountering the analogy in the feminist judgment. 
Also, every time I read any feminist judgment from any 
jurisdiction, I am reminded of the importance of providing factual 
context and providing enough detail about a client, for example, so 
that a court can fully understand the client’s complete humanity. 
So often, in tax cases and other areas too, we tend to look at the 
‘deal,’ the ‘transaction,’ or the ‘incident.’ But every breach of the law, 
every harm, happens in some sort of context. Who the client is 
matters very much to how the client experiences that breach. It is 
important as lawyers that we continue to present the full stories of 
our clients. The narrative and the doctrinal law are important; we 
need to master both. 
Susan Appleton 
 
 Like others, I feel hopeful that we will see the impact in the 
years to come, once students who have become acquainted with 
feminist judgments take on positions as judicial clerks and possibly 
 
 167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 168. Mary Louise Fellows, Rewritten Opinion in Welch v. Helvering, in FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS, supra note 21, at 103–20. 
 169. MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (Bantam Classic 2003) (1818). 
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judges, as I said earlier and as echoed by Troy.170 Beyond that, 
however, I think the worldwide reach of the feminist judgments idea 
and the significant number of scholars and attorneys who have 
contributed to the various volumes reveal that legal feminists have 




 I agree with everyone’s points on the importance of teaching 
and encouraging our students to critique the law through various 
lenses. This is particularly important to us in England and Wales 
at the moment, as we will be moving to a different system of legal 
qualification brought about by the Solicitors Regulatory Authority 
in 2021; students will need to pass a new set of practical exams 
before moving onto work experience.171 These new exams will not 
require a law degree beforehand, so looking down the road, it may 
result in U.K. law schools teaching a much more practical 
perspective of law (and less liberal arts-oriented, as an 
undergraduate degree). The aim of the change is to diversify the 
practice of law and the judiciary, but in the attempt for greater 
diversity, I fear a new more doctrinal, practical law degree is what 
will emerge. We might be forced to stop teaching feminist 
judgments in the wake of competition for law students, and as a 
result, we turn to the practical side of law where there is little room 
for any valuable critique. Hopefully not, but at this point it is 
difficult to see what the future will hold in terms of legal education 
for England and Wales. 
IV. Teaching with Feminist Judgments in the Future 
A. If you have any experience guiding students in writing 
their own feminist judgments, what advice would you 




 In my experience, this assignment unfolds in stages. Students 
first need to grasp the functions and conventions of judicial writing 
 
 170. See supra Part III.A (comments of Troy Lavers). 
 171. See, e.g., Solicitors Qualifying Examination, SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH., 
https://www.sra.org.uk/home/hot-topics/Solicitors-Qualifying-Examination.page  
[https://perma.cc/ML3F-GCWP] (explaining practical legal skills component of 
Solicitors Qualifying Examination, effective fall 2021). 
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(including the attributes of judgment voice). It is authoritative, but 
also justifying, explanatory, and analytic. Ultimately, it must be 
jurisprudentially persuasive. Students should appreciate (hear) the 
contributions of other voices in any judgment—the voices of 
concurring and dissenting colleagues, advocates’ voices, and the 
written voices of clerks who work closely with judicial authors to 
define the scope of an issue and follow the pathways of doctrine. The 
judgment writing seminar I teach offers this grounding in judicial 
rhetoric and voice and then raises the question of what a feminist 
judicial voice is, and how it serves a feminist vision of the law. 
Inviting students to compare closely an original and feminist 
rewritten judgment also can help them recognize specific ways that 
a feminist judgment author responds to the ‘official’ judgment’s 
treatment of the law, narrative of the facts, and its interpretive 
framework. 
It is also helpful to encourage students to identify what they 
see as ‘feminist’ in the feminist judgments they read. For example, 
a number of my students have absorbed insights about voice, 
empathy, elaboration of facts, and a judgment’s attention to the 
material and psychic impacts of law on society. Because the course 
focuses closely on process and method, students have tended to 
concentrate on these manifestations of feminist writing. 
We can also prompt students to look for evidence of how a 
judgment specifically makes visible, and more central, the 
experiences and perspectives of women and other marginalized 
members of society. When students begin to see that a range of 
perspectives and approaches are compatible with feminism and its 
justice-serving aims, they are at least in a good starting position to 




 I contemplated an assignment for undergraduates to rewrite 
an opinion, but a little reflection made it apparent that learning 
law, social theory, and a new normative theory was more than 
enough for undergraduates, without also having to learn how to 
write like a judge. However, I do think this could make a wonderful 




 My advice is to be prepared to do a lot of foundational work on 
how to write an opinion, and then do even more work on top of that 
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to show how to write a feminist or social justice opinion. One aspect 
I really like about using feminist judgments is that it makes the 
transfer of skills smoother—students do not have to ‘translate,’ 
entirely on their own, scholarly articles into judicial language. Such 
translation can be difficult because the language of academia can 
be quite far removed from law practice language. With the feminist 
judgments, students can see the social justice analysis and 
reasoning in judicial language. This gives them a good model to 
follow. But it is still hard for them. I was teaching mostly third-year 
law students in my seminar, and ‘mainstream’ law already had a 
firm grip on them. They had already read hundreds of opinions that 
contain no feminist or social justice reasoning, as well as many 
opinions that explicitly denigrate that reasoning. The students have 
been indoctrinated to think that is what law is—and that is all that 
law is and can be. It is hard to undo that with a few feminist 
opinions, but we can start the process by having them read feminist 
judgments and then write their own. The writing process is, of 
course, transformative in cementing the use of feminist reasoning, 
so I encourage professors to have students write their own feminist 
judgments. 
The other caveat I would add is to choose carefully the opinions 
your students are to rewrite. I tried to choose opinions that had 
ample records and plenty of diverse scholarly commentary so that 
the students would not have to completely re-invent the wheel. It is 
really helpful to have a good number of law review articles as well 
as a chapter about the case from one of the volumes in the 
Foundation Press Law Stories series.172 The Law Stories help a 
great deal in showing the students how many facts were left out of 




I would emphasize the importance of case selection. Some 
cases lend themselves to feminist rewriting more successfully than 
others. For this reason, I am not entirely excited about the 
proliferation of new feminist judgments volumes because I will not 
let my students choose a case once it has been used for a published 
 
 172. See, e.g., Law Stories Series (Paul Caron ed., Foundation Press), 
https://subscription.westacademic.com/Search?seriesFilter=22  [https://perma.cc/9W
PR-NB32] (listing thirty-seven subject-matter specific volumes that provide 
historical context and a ‘behind-the-scenes’ discussion of details, including some 
previously unknown, for well-known U.S. cases in the field). 
 173. See id. 
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feminist judgment. I worry that the U.S. Feminist Judgments 
Project, as I have worked with it, is becoming a victim of its own 
success, as more and more cases are becoming ‘off limits’ for student 
rewriting! 
B. What might be some ways to think about teaching with 
feminist judgments across borders of subject-matter, 




 I envision an interdisciplinary, intergenerational space that 
welcomes students and professors from graduate programs and 
professional schools, as well as members of the community who are 
interested in examining and obliterating inequity. In this space, 
participants would be encouraged to study the limits of the 
jurisprudence that exists for our most pressing social issues, to 
imagine what it could be, and to create it. Historically, impact 
litigation has incorporated interdisciplinary knowledge to make 
legal arguments. Students and scholars from interdisciplinary and 
lay backgrounds would operate as a think tank in real time, offering 
disciplinary knowledge and perspectives to develop solutions to 
societal problems. 
Consider, for example, a course called Feminisms. This course 
would engage in different conceptualizations of many specialists, 
including feminist historians; African diasporic, Asian diasporic, 
Latinx, and Indigenous studies scholars; social scientists; scientists; 
humanitarians; business, medical, and legal professionals; and the 
non-academic/non-professional, childfree, parents, grandparents, 
actual and fictive kin networks, and community activists. Feminist 
judgments would anchor the course, as well as readings in feminist 
and womanist theories.174 Both would be integrated as the 
theoretical framework to examine issues in reproductive justice, 
 
 174. Writer Alice Walker explains that “Womanist is to feminist as purple to 
lavender.” ALICE WALKER, IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS’ GARDENS xii (1983). 
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Alice Walker proposed in 1990 
that “‘womanism’ provides a contemporary alternative to ‘feminism’ that better 
addresses the needs of Black women and women of color more generally. But given 
more recent work on trans issues such a gender-specific term would today raise many 
more problems than it would solve.” Feminist Philosophy, 2.2 Normative and 
Descriptive Components, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (June 28, 2018), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-philosophy [https://perma.cc/55H4-YZBN]. 
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employment equity, sexual assault and harassment, and career 
advancement, among many others. 
Ideally, this course would have counterparts in at least three 
universities—two in different regions of the United States, and one 
in another country. All of the courses would have a common 
syllabus. Once a month over the course of a year, the classes would 
meet on a visual, digital platform to discuss the readings and 
brainstorm strategies. The final projects for the course would be 
local and activist in nature. Students would partner with their 
communities to address problems that the community members 
identify. The class would end with presentations by the course 
participants to community stakeholders, and a plan to implement 




 At least from the perspective of a U.S.-based law teacher, I 
would say that our students do not get much exposure to the 
substantive law or interpretive traditions of other countries, even 
other common law jurisdictions. My (admittedly) limited interaction 
with scholars and teachers based in other jurisdictions leaves me 
with the impression that Canadian and Australian legal education 
is different in that respect. The Canadian and Australian students 
(and their teachers) seem to be more conversant with U.S. cases and 
legal methods than U.S. students (and their teachers, myself 
included) are with Canadian and Australian law. 
I do wonder whether the various feminist judgments projects 
might be a way to bridge some of those gaps. First, to the extent we 
were ever able to coordinate logistically, I think U.S. students would 
enjoy being ‘paired’ with counterparts from another jurisdiction. We 
might be able to develop an assignment that invites the students to 
identify a case in each jurisdiction that addresses a similar issue. 
Instead of trying to rewrite the opinions, the students would jointly 
read both original opinions. After identifying similarities and 
differences (and the reasons for those), the students could work 
collaboratively on developing a narrative description of the types of 
questions, approaches, or emphases that, if grounded in feminist 
jurisprudence, might have changed the result or reasoning in the 
case. Students would identify an important text, scholar, line of 
thinking, or method in the feminist legal theoretical tradition of 
their home jurisdictions and explain how that could apply in both 
cases, domestically and across borders. 
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The purposes of an assignment like this would be to ask not 
only what difference a feminist perspective might make in judicial 
opinions, but also to learn about different articulations of feminisms 
and the cultural, historical, and political forces that contribute to 
shaping the context in which a case arises. This type of course would 
be logistically challenging, but could be intellectually enriching for 
all involved. And even better if the course could combine with 
reciprocal visits by each group of students to the other jurisdiction 
and university. Especially in the United States, I think that we need 
to expand our jurisprudential view to include greater knowledge of, 




 I love this question about borders. My institution is in Detroit, 
about one-quarter mile away from the tunnel that separates the 
United States and Canada, and we have a dual degree program with 
the University of Windsor Faculty of Law, an Ontario law school. 
The program allows students to earn both a Canadian law degree 
and U.S. law degree in three years.175 Our student body is roughly 
40% Canadian, and our faculty also has fairly regular interaction 
with our Canadian counterparts. It is absolutely true, as Bridget 
said, that the Canadian law faculty and Canadian students are 
much more attuned to legal trends and doctrines in other countries. 
Any country with a common law heritage is part of the conversation, 
and there is also greater awareness of and openness to the legal 
perspectives of Indigenous peoples. Moreover, many of my 
Canadian students are extremely enthusiastic about the feminist 
judgments project. 
I see several ways we could teach across national borders with 
feminist judgments. One suggestion for the United States and 
Canada might be to offer a seminar focused on feminism and 
comparative constitutional law.176 As many readers of this dialogue 
 
 175. Canadian and American Dual JD Program, DETROIT MERCY LAW, 
http://www.law.udmercy.edu/academics/degrees-offered/dual-jd.php 
[https://perma.cc/A22W-PZ6L] (detailing school’s joint degree program whereby 
students can earn both Canadian and U.S. law degrees in three years). 
 176. Across a greater distance, Professor Heather Roberts of Australia National 
University and Professor Heather Elliott of the University of Alabama Hugh F. 
Culverhouse Jr. School of Law engage in a five-week exchange devoted to comparing 
jurisprudence of the High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of the United 
States. See News & Events, AUSTL. NAT’L UNIV. COLL. OF L. (Apr. 17, 2019), 
https://lawschool.anu.edu.au/news-and-events/news/sweet-home-alabama-studying-
law-deep-south [https://perma.cc/B2ZN-TMQT] (describing experiences of 
Australian students participating in exchange program). 
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probably know, Canadian lawyers, academics, and activists have 
worked as part of the Women’s Court of Canada project to rewrite 
from a feminist perspective the equality jurisprudence of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.177 I can envision a very 
rich dialogue that would follow from a class in which students 
compare portions of the U.S. Constitution and Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, compare ‘official’ judicial opinions on various 
constitutional topics, and then examine the rewritten U.S. and 
Canadian feminist opinions and commentary. Comparative 




As a teacher of international law, this question about borders 
is an easy one. International law crosses boundaries already and 
incorporates the issues of individuals and states from around the 
world. The teaching of the international feminist judgments means 
feminist methodologies can be translated into international 
judgments that are accessible to every international lawyer. The 
creation and expansion of the numerous feminist judgments 
projects around the world in different domestic jurisdictions lends 
support to each new project. We are a growing collective. 
My co-editor Loveday Hodson and I hope that other 
international law projects will emerge. Perhaps phase two of these 
projects can be more comparative work. 
As international law teachers, we ourselves have not yet 
touched upon domestic judgments that discuss international law. 




 One of the great joys of the Scottish Feminist Judgments 
Project’s coming after many of the other projects is that we have 
been able to feel part of a global conversation. We have really 
benefited from the insights and development of pre-existing 
projects, each of which speaks in its own distinctive register from 
its own unique perspective, but also engages and plays around with 
the confines of feminist judging in innovative ways. We have been 
particularly inspired in the Scottish project by some of the steps 
taken in the Aotearoa New Zealand and Northern/Irish projects to 
disrupt certain conventions of mainstream judging. This is what 
 
 177. See Majury, supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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inspired us to develop the creative strand of the project, and it has 
been such a revelation to us throughout!178 
In Edinburgh, in July 2019, we hosted a workshop with 
representation from Scottish, African, and Indian Feminist 
Judgment Projects,179 building on a post that we did together for the 
Social and Legal Studies blog.180 We are really excited to see where 
that dialogue takes us. 
C. What questions do you have for other people who are 




 I would be grateful for any recommendation on other texts to 
accompany the feminist judgments. I use Nancy Levit’s Feminist 
Legal Theory,181 Kitty Calavita’s Invitation to Law and Society,182 
excerpts from the sociological canon, Silvia Federici’s Caliban and 
the Witch,183 and Ruth Schwartz Cowan’s More Work for Mother.184 
Most of these are pretty complicated reads for undergraduates, so 





 178. See, e.g., supra Part II.A (comments of Sharon Cowan) (discussing the 
Scottish Feminist Judgments Project engagement with artistic work). 
 179. Meeting at the Intersections of Feminist Judgments: The Indian, African and 
Scottish FJP Workshop, THE UNIV. OF EDINBURGH, 
https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/en/events/meeting-at-the-intersections-of-
feminist-judgments-the-indian-african-and-scottish-fjp-workshop(0620f33d-9446-
4544-b9d0-433c6c69bc48).html [https://perma.cc/FVP6-ZB5S]. See also Scottish 
Feminist Judgments Project – Tour, THE UNIV. OF EDINBURGH, https://www.law
.ed.ac.uk/news-events/events/scottish-feminist-judgment-project-tour-3 [https://pe
rma.cc/R3VA-564C] (listing upcoming workshop dates and explaining the details of 
the sessions). 
 180. Sharon Cowan, Chloe Kennedy, Jill Kennedy-McNeill, Ambreena Manji, 
Vanessa Munro, Sibongile Ndashe, Sharifah Sekalalam & Jhuma Sen, Feminist 
Judging: From Margin to Centre, SOC. & LEGAL STUD. BLOG, (Nov. 21, 2018), 
https://socialandlegalstudies.wordpress.com//2018/11/21/feminist-judging-margin-
centre/ [https://perma.cc/38EL-NZE3] (exploring commonalities and differences 
among Indian, Scottish, and African Feminist Judgments Projects). 
 181. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 45. 
 182. CALAVITA, supra note 46. 
 183. SILVIA FEDERICI, CALIBAN AND THE WITCH: WOMEN, THE BODY AND 
PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION (2004). 
 184. RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, MORE WORK FOR MOTHER: THE IRONIES OF 
HOUSEHOLD TECHNOLOGY FROM THE OPEN HEARTH TO THE MICROWAVE (1983). 
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D. Is there a course in which you have not yet used feminist 
judgments, but you think there might be some 




 I use feminist judgments in an LLM module called Feminist 
Perspectives on International Law, but I struggle to get colleagues 
to agree to add feminism as a topic in the undergraduate LLB 
course on international law, perhaps because some on the teaching 
team may prioritize a more ‘black-letter’ approach to international 
law. Last time I argued for it I was turned down flat. Now that our 
collection is published, I have added a feminist judgment to the 
reading list for the section I teach, International Criminal Law. I 
will try to convince the team to add feminist judgments to their part 
of the reading lists. This may be easier to achieve than adding 
feminism as a topic. 
I think it is really important to expose students to a 
representative of feminism methodologies in the mainstream 
curriculum. It is inspiring to read how many other people are using 
feminist judgments in their teaching, especially large group 
teaching. I would love to get feminist judgments integrated into the 




 I am so very keen to use Vuletich v. R, the evidence law 
feminist judgment from the Aotearoa New Zealand project which 
concerns the admissibility of similar fact or propensity evidence in 
a rape case.185 The difficulty is that to understand and properly 
engage with the nuanced critique in that decision, students need to 
be operating at quite a sophisticated level, which many do not reach, 
given the amount of class time and the breadth of material to cover. 
It may have to wait for a graduate class. 
 
 185. Compare Vuletich v. R [2010] NZCA 102 (N.Z.) (unanimous decision that the 
defendant’s alleged sexual offending against another woman on a different occasion 
was inadmissible as propensity evidence and the two charges were to be tried 
separately) with Carissa Cross, Rewritten Opinion in Vuletich v. R, in AOTEAROA 
NEW ZEALAND FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 469–78 (dissenting judgment 
asserting that the primary issue at trial was the credibility of both the complainants, 
stressing the similarities of both alleged offences, and concluding the charges should 
be joined and the propensity evidence cross-admissible). 
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I would also very much like to wrestle off one of my colleagues 
the consent portion of our criminal law course, so as to use the 
rewritten version of R v. Brown.186 It is of concern to me that the 
case is still taught to second-year law students in a mostly uncritical 
way—and I really wonder how safe they feel reading and discussing 
the kinds of pronouncements made by the House of Lords 
(regarding sexuality and choice).187 There will be young people for 
whom university is their first opportunity to start to feel 
comfortable with their own identities and, in my view, we have an 
obligation to not only be aware of the impact of the cases we teach, 
but to provide a balance to the debate in highly contestable and 
personally triggering areas. The reimagined judgment and 
beautifully-crafted commentary really are essential additions to 




 My goal is to integrate the feminist judgments projects into 
the required (compulsory) legal writing curriculum. The legal 
academy is a colonized space that normalizes Western (White) 
epistemologies (ways of knowing) and ontologies (ways of being). If 
legal educators continue to contextualize legal knowledge in 
colonial rhetoric, then students will perpetuate it without the tools 
to problematize it. 
Starting in the 2018-2019 academic year, in the first-semester 
legal writing course at Mercer, I introduced first-year students to 
multicultural rhetorics (Indigenous, African and Asian diasporic, 
 
 186. Compare R v. Brown [1992] UKHL 7, [1994] 1 AC 212 (Eng.) (dismissing on 
policy grounds by a 3-2 vote charges of actual and grievous bodily harm against 
members of group of gay men who engaged in consensual sadomasochistic sex over 
a period of years, where no police complaint ever filed) with Robin Mackenzie, 
Rewritten Opinion in R v. Brown, in ENGLISH/WELSH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra 
note 2, at 247–54 (reaching same result but for different reasons, notably recognizing 
a consent defense in cases of consensual sadomasochistic sexual activity). 
 187. See, e.g., R v. Brown [1993] 1 AC 212 (HL) 97 Cr. App. 44, 51  (Eng.) (“There 
was no evidence to support the assertion that sado-masochist activities are essential 
to the happiness of the appellants or any other participants, but the argument would 
be acceptable if sado-masochism were only concerned with sex, as the appellants 
contend. . . .The evidence discloses that the practices of the appellants were 
unpredictably dangerous and degrading to body and mind and were developed with 
increasing barbarity and taught to persons whose consents were dubious or 
worthless.”). 
 188. See Mackenzie, supra note 186; Matthew Weait & Rosemary Hunter, 
Commentary on R v. Brown, in ENGLISH/WELSH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 
2, at 241. 
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and Latinx rhetorics).189 I used these rhetorics as oppositional to the 
Western rhetorical discourse that has been taught as ‘neutral’ in 
legal writing pedagogy and practice.190 In the future, I plan to 
integrate multicultural rhetorics completely into my writing 
courses. This will include various opinions from U.S. Feminist 
Judgments, as they also serve as oppositional discourse to Western 
legal rhetorical practices.191 Ultimately, I wish to center these 
rhetorics and teach students how to use them effectively to create 
oppositional discourse as they develop various genres necessary for 
law practice. 
 
Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon 
 
 We have been speaking to colleagues teaching criminal law 
and property law about the value of a critical judgments exercise in 
their compulsory courses. We do not think it would be limited to 
these areas, and can see the possibility of a dedicated critical 
judgments exercise in a much wider range of compulsory courses, 
including torts law and corporate law. Indeed, we would like to see 
a critical exercise introduced more widely across the curriculum, 
and across traditionally public and private areas of law, lest 
students gain the (wrong) impression that critical perspectives are 




 I generally teach what Alice Abreu has affectionately called 
“money-law” courses.192 I am excited about the U.S. Feminist 
 
 189. See, e.g., Cynthia Fabrizio Pelak, Teaching and Learning About Settler-
colonial Racism: A Case for “Unsettling” Minoritizing and Multicultural Perspectives, 
5 SOC. RACE & ETHNICITY 294 (2019) (discussing anti-racist and decolonizing 
teaching methods). 
 190. The ways that ostensibly neutral rhetoric disguises particular viewpoints has 
long been a critique of critical legal scholars. For an early articulation of this view, 
see generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). For a critique focused on legal writing and legal 
methods pedagogy, see generally Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is Futile: How 
Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law’s Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 
103 DICKINSON L. REV. 7 (1998). 
 191. See, e.g., Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, Still Writing at the Master’s Table: 
Decolonizing Rhetoric in Legal Writing for a “Woke” Legal Academy, 21 SCHOLAR: ST. 
MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 255 (2019) (exploring multicultural rhetorical 
practices); Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, The Practical Implications of Unexamined 
Assumptions: Disrupting Flawed Legal Arguments to Advance the Cause of Justice, 
58 WASHBURN L.J. 531 (2019) (exploring feminist rhetorical practices). 
 192. See Alice G. Abreu, Tax Counts: Bringing Money-Law to LatCrit, 78 DENV. 
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Judgments Series of subject-matter specific books.193 There is one 
in the works for Trusts & Estates and Corporations. The Trusts & 
Estates cases seem to be an easy fit for feminist judgments, in some 
way, because they involve how we think about families, 
relationships, power, and expressions of intimacy. Feminist legal 
scholars have been interested historically in all of these topics. But 
I think corporate law is ripe for re-envisioning as well. Sure, there 
are certain state corporation statutes, but might a feminist judge 
articulate a corporate director’s fiduciary duty differently than a 
non-feminist judge? Maybe. Maybe not. But it is something I think 
about quite often. And we might also understand partnerships, 
especially family limited partnerships, differently through feminist 
lenses. Limited partnership agreements give rise to so much more 
than the legal structure that is captured by the document. They also 
can change family dynamics, preserve wealth, and serve as vehicles 
for retaining control while involving the next generation of a family 
in a business, for example.194 Feminists should be (and hopefully 
are) interested in the way that these vehicles operate.195 There are 
questions about equality, equity, sameness and difference, gender, 
and power in so many areas of the law. 
E. What advice do you have for colleagues who might be 
interested in teaching with feminist judgments, but are 




 I would say start small and dive in. Take one case that you 
cover in a course, but do not assign it from the casebook. Use an 
 
U.L. REV. 575, 575 n.1 (2001) (“By ‘money-law,’ I mean the areas traditionally viewed 
as comprising the business curriculum: tax, corporations, securities, commercial law 
(UCC), securities [sic], banking, antitrust and the like.”). 
 193. See supra note 21. 
 194. See, e.g., Mitchell M. Gans & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Family Limited 
Partnerships and Section 2036: Not Such a Good Fit, 42 ACTEC L.J. 253 (2017) 
(describing use of family limited partnerships in estate planning); Brad M. Kaplan, 
Best Practices in Succession Planning for the Closely-Held Business, in FAMILY AND 
BUSINESS SUCCESSION PLANNING STRATEGIES (2009) (explaining how family limited 
partnership can play a role in both business and succession planning). 
 195. See also Geri Stengel, How to Put Your Money Where Your Feminism Is, 
FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017, 11:17 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/geristengel/2017
/12/06/how-to-put-your-money-where-your-feminism-is/#5678f16b79fd [https://per
ma.cc/62E5-RVQB] (encouraging women to become active investors, especially 
through women-owned vehicles, noting that “[m]any women-owned funds are finding 
that women have an increasing interest in becoming limited partners in private 
equity funds”). 
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unformatted version, perhaps from an online source, and present it 
to the students side-by-side with the feminist judgment, also in an 
unformatted version. Ask the students to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of each opinion. Ask which opinion gets the law ‘right’ 
and why. Ask the students whether they can perceive any 
theoretical or methodological commitments that undergird the 
opinion. It is that simple. This allows us to teach ‘the law,’ in the 
sense of the black-letter holding of the case, while also talking about 
how decisions get made, how to structure legal arguments, and how 




 Like Bridget, I would also advocate diving in, but in a selective 
way. Choose a case that you might already cover, or one in your area 
of interest that has been reimagined. Maybe you will even have a 
different rewrite to offer your students—this is part of the learning, 
of course. There are many ways to craft a decision that has legal 
validity. How you use the case will very much depend on the class—
its size, the age and experience of the students, how much front-
loading you will need to do, as Kathryn explained, so that the 
participants can understand the significance and value of the 
feminist judgment. To get the best pedagogical value from a 
feminist judgment, I believe, students have to be working at a level 
that they understand the method and are open to engaging with 
critical analysis. That said, it is possible, as I have done in my 
criminal law class, to focus on an aspect of a judgment to make the 
points of significance. 
Of course, whatever you do, reading a feminist judgment will 
not be appealing to all students as an exercise or as a learning 
experience. We know that there are students who are not ready or 
willing to embrace legal education as essentially (and importantly) 
involving questioning and critique. That should not at all deter you 
from diving in. You will, I promise, awake and inspire students who 
will then come to accept that advocating for social and legal reform 




 For the course Law, Politics, and Society, I wanted to 
integrate social theory, normative theory, and law. Feminist 
judgments greatly facilitate that integration, but it takes a long 
time to design the assignments and readings for undergraduates. If 
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you do not have the time to do this, I recommend using individual 
feminist judgments to compare and contrast with the originals and 
to build that exercise into an undergraduate constitutional law 
course. 
 
Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon 
 
 First, read articles like this about teaching with critical 
judgments and talk to others who have had experiences teaching 
with critical judgments to get an idea of what might work for you. 
Second, like Elisabeth said, start with a small exercise (maybe one 
class in the teaching term). Do not be afraid that it might fall a bit 
flat initially, or that you will have to tweak it, this is always the way 
when you start something new that is worthwhile! Third, make sure 
you set the students up for it well. Give the students advance 
warning, explain the objectives of the activity, make sure your 
instructions are clear, and set out your expectations of them in 
approaching an often-sensitive exercise. This is often the first time 
they are engaging in such an exercise, and they will be feeling 
anxious as well. Fourth, have courage that the students will 
respond with genuine engagement. That has always been our 
experience 
E. If you have any publicly available teaching materials that 
relate to your teaching use of feminist judgments, where 




 I am happy to share my syllabus for the course in Drafting 




 Feel free to DM me on Twitter—@genremixtress—for access 




 The course attracted quite a large number of students, so I 
will be revising it and teaching it again. I would be happy to pass 
along the syllabus and other course materials, as well as discuss 
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I would be happy to share my syllabus for the course called 
Writing from a Judicial Perspective, and the writer’s memo 
questions, I ask students to answer about their use of feminist 
judgments. I will also be developing a variation of the course that I 
plan to launch in Spring 2020, a two-credit seminar focused on 
rewriting an opinion (and thus closer in its scope and work product 
to the feminist judgments projects). I am envisioning that the class 
will work with a final judgment from a federal or state court. 
Although the course assignment will not require a feminist 
rewriting, we will use U.S. Feminist Judgments196 as a text 
providing exemplars of judgments rewritten from a justice-oriented, 
feminist perspective. I will encourage students to draw from 
feminism or another perspective that is justice-enhancing. I plan to 
offer students an additional credit if they take on a judicial-writing 
placement during the same semester. I will arrange the placements 
and coordinate students’ experience in both components of the class, 
to promote reflection on practical applications of classroom 
learning. 
Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon 
 
 Our book The Critical Judgments Project197 contains in 
Chapter 1 a number of the teaching tools that we draw upon in our 
Federal Constitutional Law class in Australia. In addition, we are 
developing a Critical Judgments Project website, on which we will 
be making available to other teachers our teaching guide for the 
class, as well as other materials from feminist judgments and other 
critical judgments projects around the world. In the meantime, 




I am also happy to share our syllabus and reading lists if 
anyone would like them. Or, if you would like to comment on 
anything included here, please feel free to email me. 
 
 
 196. U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2. 
 197. CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27. 
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V. Feminist Judgments as a Form of Teaching, Scholarship, 
and Service 
A. Given the way you use feminist judgments, would you 
classify them as a form of legal scholarship, a 




I would say all of the above! As I have used feminist judgments 
in my Writing from a Judicial Perspective class at CUNY Law 
School, the rewritten opinions are certainly teaching tools. They are 
exemplars of intentional judicial writing, resources that students 
can draw from as they draft an opinion in the pending U.S. Supreme 
Court case we are studying. 
These judgments are also engaged scholarship, melding the 
conventions of judicial writing and close analysis of law and facts 
with a vision of what the law should cover and protect. The 
judgments thus embed a scholarly thesis, or claim, that otherwise 
might appear in a law review article critiquing existing doctrine or 
offering a revised understanding of the law. 
The judgments are a form of activism because they apply 
pressure to constricted understandings of the social realities that 
law should take into account. For example, Laura Rosenbury’s 
forthright, feminist version of Griswold v. Connecticut argues for a 
broader view of what individual liberty encompasses; because 
consensual sexual activity can encourage personal identity 
formation and interpersonal relations, laws banning contraception 
impede the full experience of personal liberty that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects.198 Similarly, Val 
Vojdik’s expanded equal protection rationale for striking down 
Virginia Military Institute’s males-only admissions policy in United 
States v. Virginia argues for fundamental changes to the Institute’s 
culture of aggressive masculinity and adopts a strict scrutiny 
standard for assessing gender classifications. 199 Both measures are 
needed to ensure that women are fully incorporated into the 
Institute’s program. Because these feminist judgments push back 
 
 198. See Rosenbury, supra note 84. 
 199. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (holding that 
males-only admission policy lacked an “exceedingly persuasive justification”) with 
Valorie K. Vojdik, Rewritten Opinion in United States v. Virginia, in U.S. FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 389–407 (reaching same result but employing strict 
scrutiny for gender-based classifications). 
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against societal norms and practices that oppress women, and show 
how the law can be a tool for enhancing women’s liberty and 




 I agree with Andrea. A feminist judgment is a teaching tool, 
scholarship, and activism all at once.200 For the person who is 
rewriting a case, the judgment is an exercise in legal argumentation 
at its core. Using the facts and law in effect at the time of the initial 
opinion, how might the feminist judgment writer reach a different 
conclusion or use different reasoning to reach the same conclusion 
as the original opinion writer? To participate in that process is to 
study the law and explain it to others. But feminist judgments do 
so by showing, not telling. It is scholarship in an alternate format. 
Non-traditional scholarship has not always been eagerly received 
by the legal academy.201 I think, for example, of some of the early 
criticism launched at work in the critical race theory area.202 But 
critical race theory shows us—does not just tell us—that the 
language of law is not just the language of traditional law review 
articles.203 It can be the language of personal experience, history, or 
other narratives.204 So, too, feminist judgments show that judicial 
opinions and judicial language can rely on a range of sources, deploy 
a wide range of language, explicitly embrace a theoretical lens, and 





 200. See also Bridget J. Crawford, Kathryn M. Stanchi & Linda L. Berger, 
Feminist Judging Matters: How Feminist Theory and Methods Affect the Process of 
Judgment, 47 U. BALT. L. REV. 167, 197 (2017) (“If our work on any of the Feminist 
Judgments projects contributes to solving problems of gender equality and advancing 
justice, we gladly embrace the multiple labels of scholars, activists, and educators.”). 
 201. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 893, 907 (2015) (discussing negative reactions to critical race theory writing). 
 202. Id. 
 203. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146–48 
(1991) (recounting her personal experience renting an apartment in New York with 
that of a white male colleague to illustrate  how the presence or absence of a written 
rental contract can take on different meanings, based on the relative power positions, 
including those linked to race, gender, and historical practices of the contracting 
parties). 
 204. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 201, at 899–902 (surveying different forms of 
critical race theory writing). 
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Vanessa Munro 
 
 I agree with Andrea and Bridget. To my mind, rewriting 
judicial opinions from a feminist perspective is a combination of a 
teaching tool, scholarship, and activism—or at least it has this 
potential. The feminist judgments have the capacity to be of interest 
to policy-makers, judges, and practitioners (even if only out of 
curiosity); to make students understand and challenge legal 
methods and concepts; to promote reflection on feminist approaches 
and gender equality; and to agitate for change by raising public 
consciousness (e.g., through art exhibitions but also through things 
like our coverage in mainstream media). 
Conclusion 
(Linda L. Berger, Bridget J. Crawford, and Kathryn M. Stanchi) 
 
At law schools and in undergraduate courses in the United 
States and law schools internationally, professors are using 
feminist judgments in seminars, courses in brief and opinion 
writing, jurisprudence courses, and subject-matter specific courses 
such as tax and criminal law.205 Other instructors may want to 
experience for themselves the benefits that are obtained from using 
feminist judgments in the classroom. First and foremost, by reading 
the alternative judgments in comparison with the original 
judgments, students learn more about the use of language and how 
variations in word choice and style affect writers and readers.206 
Through reading the feminist judgments, students encounter voices 
and aspects of history that are often neglected.207 They see how 
other writers have transformed theory into practice and how 
experienced brief writers have pursued their own social justice 
goals.208 Especially in courses where students write all or part of 
their own alternative judgments, students begin to understand how 
they may participate in crafting persuasive arguments using a 
range of sources.209 
 
 205. See supra Part I.A. 
 206. See, e.g., LINDA L. BERGER & KATHRYN M. STANCHI, LEGAL PERSUASION: A 
RHETORICAL APPROACH TO THE SCIENCE 6 (2017) (“The key to rhetorical situation 
analysis is to precisely identify the trigger or prompt for the advocacy. Different 
prompts evoke different audiences and impose different constraints on the rhetorical 
response.”). 
 207. See supra Part II. 
 208. See supra Part II. 
 209. See supra Part II. 
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In addition, using feminist judgments in the classroom 
introduces students to feminist theory and feminist history, 
illustrates the application of theory to practice in the form of the 
rewritten judicial opinions, helps students recognize the obstacles 
posed to social justice activism by precedent, and exposes the 
contingency of judicial decision-making by helping students see that 
the original opinions were often only one option.210 The feminist 
judgments highlight techniques of persuasion while illuminating 
constraints on opinion writing. They provide models for writing 
opinions and briefs that apply feminist and critical theory and 
methods to social justice contexts. In this way, familiarity with 
feminist judgments expands student understanding of available 
legal theories and demonstrates the use of feminist methods such 
as practical reasoning and narrative. Finally, they illustrate the 
power of comparative learning by encouraging students to contrast 
opinions decided from different perspectives as well as from 
different jurisdictions.211 
For all of these reasons, feminist judgments are unique 
teaching tools that can accomplish multiple goals through a 
seemingly simple exercise of comparing an original opinion with one 
rewritten using all of the same facts and law, but coming to a 
different conclusion (or reaching the same conclusion for different 
reasons).212 We are excited about using feminist judgments in the 
classroom and hope that teachers from all levels—secondary 
education, colleges, law schools, and other graduate and 
professional programs—will experiment with different ways of 
teaching and learning. There is a global community waiting to 
assist and support anyone who would like to try. 
 
 
 210. See supra Parts II and III. 
 211. See supra Parts II and III. 
 212. See Stanchi, Berger, & Crawford, Introduction, supra note 8, at 9 (explaining 
that opinion authors “could draw only on facts and law in existence at the time of the 
original opinion” and that authors “were free to choose to write a majority opinion, a 
dissent, or a concurrence, depending on their goals”). Of the twenty-five opinions in 
the book, the eight re-imagined majority opinions were roughly evenly divided 
between those that changed the ruling and that those that changed the reasoning 
only. Id. 
